Results: Building an Analytic Capability" provides a holistic framework that will help companies maximize this resource. By outlining all the elements necessary to transform data into knowledge and then into business results, the paper helps managers understand that human performance elements must be attended to in addition to technology. The experience of over 20 companies who were successful in their datato-knowledge efforts helps us present both the critical success factors that must be present as well as specific, tangible advice for companies seeking to build a robust analytic capability. Data to Knowledge to Results · Page 3 ©2001 Accenture · Institute for Strategic Change · www.accenture.com/isc how it could save over $100 million by changing its purchasing patterns.
how it could save over $100 million by changing its purchasing patterns.
Wachovia Bank uses customer transaction data to support a modeling process that evaluates each branch's current and long-term profitability. In Atlanta, the bank's largest market, Wachovia showed significant performance improvements when it used the outputs of the modeling process as a basis to decide which of its 96 branches to close and in which locations to open new ones.
The problem is that turning data into knowledge just doesn't happen often enough. And even if a company does manage to transform data into knowledge and then into results, it is rarely a sustained or widespread process. In our experience, the companies mentioned above were exceptions. In the rush to ensure that employees and suppliers are paid, orders are taken accurately, debits and credits are posted to the right ledgers, and the data warehouse is full, most organizations have neglected what we consider to be the most important step in the data transformation process: the human realm of analyzing and interpreting data and then acting on the insights.
Throughout our research, we found that while companies have emphasized important technology and data infrastructure initiatives, they have virtually ignored the organizational, cultural, and strategic changes necessary to leverage their investments. They lack the broad capabilities needed to perform high-level data-based business analysis and the cultures, business processes, and performance measures needed to make and implement data-driven decisions.
The purpose of this paper is to present a framework that clearly identifies and articulates the primary success factors that must be present in order to build broad organizational capabilities for transforming data into knowledge and then into business results. 4 Throughout the paper, we will not only describe our findings, but we include specific, tangible advice garnered from our research. The final section of the paper will provide managers with a general, action-oriented guide as to how to implement the model as a whole.
Our Research Method
We were persuaded that companies have a problem in this area by our participation in previous studies of certain types of data environments. 5 To begin our research, we conducted some initial exploratory interviews in order to better underOne of the most enduring traits of the information age is that we have focused too much on mastering transaction data and not enough on turning it into information and knowledge that can lead to business results. The information systems in organizations gather zillions of bits and bytes of data from business transactions in order to serve operational or record keeping needs. We are awash in data on topics ranging from customer purchases, supplier payments, loan repayment schedules, work hours by charge code, and the amount of education and training received by employees. Despite our growing abilities to collect all this data, however, most of us are still struggling to develop the very capabilities that prompted us to gather data in the first place: the ability to aggregate, analyze, and use data to make informed decisions that lead to action and generate real business value. It's not that data doesn't get turned into knowledge and results at all, nor that we don't really know how to do it. Many of the tools and skills that can help organizations leverage transaction data have been around for years. Decision support, executive information systems, online analytic processing, and data warehousing and data mining were all designed to help us meet these needs. In fact, one of us coauthored a book on executive information systems more than ten years ago, and other books on decision support existed well prior to that. 2 The problem is not that sufficient money isn't being spent on analytic technologies. Today the market for "business intelligence and data warehousing" tools and services, according to one market research organization, is growing at an average rate of more than 50% and is expected to reach $113 billion by 2002. 3 And it's not that some companies aren't making significant progress in turning data into knowledge. Our research uncovered the following:
Earthgrains, a $2 billion bakery products company, uses SAP data in its Refrigerated Dough Division to analyze product profitability. This has led to the elimination of 20 percent of the division's product line and a 70 percent jump in the division's earnings during the first year that profitability data was available.
Owens & Minor, a $3 billion distributor of healthcare and medical supplies, has the goal of reducing supply chain costs by providing customers Web-based access to transaction data that can be used to analyze purchasing practices. The company has already secured at least one major long-term contract by showing a hospital chain being used to change management and decision-making processes. 7 In other words, is ERP data being turned into information and knowledge, or is it simply being used to process basic business transactions? We found that some companies (e.g., Microsoft and Dow Chemical) had developed new performance measurement contexts in which their ERP data fit and that other companies (e.g., Earthgrains and Amerada Hess) had specific examples of how ERP data had led to money-saving and money-making business decisions. However, there weren't enough of these success stories. More than 60 companies with ERP systems were canvassed on the issue. Fewer than five had made substantial progress at turning data into knowledge, or could give any specific examples of how decisions and actions had been affected by ERP data.
The use of customer data also provides evidence of a general lack of analytic capabilities. Take "customer asset management" systems that track customer financial data in brokerage houses, for example. Although they could be used to support knowledge management initiatives such as customer problem resolution, the forwarding of customer and product knowledge to other parts of the organization, and trend analysis of customer interactions and product problems, they are generally only used to support simple service transactions. Two multi-company studies confirmed that even though companies gather considerable customer data in their transaction systems, few summarize or synthesize it into a coherent picture of a customer across multiple different transactions and observations. 8 Even when companies did succeed in transforming customer data into knowledge, the transformation was generally within one customer-facing function (e.g., sales or customer service), rather than across the entire organization.
There are other anecdotal examples of the data-to-knowledge deficit. Scanner data in retail stores, for example, is rarely turned into knowledge. One CIO of a grocery chain that is highly regarded for its IT use confided to us that his company analyzed at most only 2% of their collected data. A different grocery chain in the Midwest recently decided to simply throw its scanner data away after selling parts of it to third-party information services. The data had been saved for years in the hope that someday it would be analyzed, but it never was.
We sense that Web transaction data will follow the same pattern. We interviewed managers from several small Internetbased firms with Web sites that generate substantial amounts of transaction data. Most say they plan to analyze the data at stand the conditions under which transaction data is successfully turned into knowledge and then into business results. We next developed an initial model that reflected our experience and tested it by interviewing managers in 20 companies that have demonstrated some success in using transaction data to improve performance. The companies we studied in detail are listed in Exhibit 1. A variety of industries, decision-making domains, and data sources were represented. 6 Finally, after presenting our initial results to many of the companies at a workshop, we further refined our framework by integrating their feedback.
Evidence of the Problem
What is the evidence that companies have difficulties turning data into knowledge? In both systematic study and casual observation, we have observed the lack of data-derived knowledge and action across a number of different situations and environments. Nearly everywhere we looked, we found managers that planned to eventually make effective use of transaction data, but hadn't seemed to have gotten around to it yet-in some cases despite more than a decade of activity. Although we looked at companies using many different types of data, the following technological contexts were most pervasive:
Enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems Customer relationship management efforts Point-of-sale scanner data in retail stores Web and e-commerce transaction data
The first context involves enterprise systems, transaction technologies that are costing many companies billions of dollars to install. One of us recently completed a research project seeking evidence that the new, high-quality data supplied by ERP packages-integrated, cross-functional, real-time, and global-is The model can be used at several different levels of an organization. At the simplest level, it can be applied to describe or understand a particular, one-time attempt to convert data into knowledge and results. For example, we used the model to understand an attempt by J Sainsbury, a U.K.-based retailer, to increase sales of cat food in its stores through more effective use of scanner data. In such instances, the presence or absence of the critical elements described in the model can help managers understand why business value was or was not created. Secondly, the model can be used to develop an ongoing capability in a particular area of a business, with particular types of data and business objectives. Most of our research sites, for example, were working primarily in one area of their businesses-retail services in banks, marketing in casinos, catalog response in a high-tech firm. Finally, it's possible to use the model as a way to understand an organization's broad capability for turning data into knowledge and results, as a few of our research sites such as Dow Chemical and Earthgrains were attempting to do.
The relationships between components of the model must be viewed differently, however, with these different applications. Context, transformation, and outcomes can thus either be viewed sequentially in the context of a particular data-based analytic decision, or more holistically in the case of building a specific or general analytic capability. We will now describe each element and its respective components below, giving examples wherever possible.
Contextual Factors in the Model
some point, but have not yet done so. We did find a few companies, however, that are attempting to utilize their data in order to meet business objectives. We already know that Owens & Minor is Web-enabling transaction data to help customers analyze and cut supply chain costs. Other firms are using software to automatically customize product and promotional offerings on their Web sites. Just how useful these Web interface applications will be without greater human intervention and involvement remains to be seen. When human attention is necessary, we believe there is still precious little significant knowledge and business results emerging from Web-driven transaction data.
Regardless of the source of the transaction data-whether it be ERP systems, marketing data warehouses, point-of-sale scanners, the Web, or just about any other system-the emerging pattern is clear. Companies are investing billions of dollars in technology that generates huge volumes of transaction data. But these investments will not live up to their potential unless firms are able to address the strategic, organizational, and cultural barriers to building broad capabilities that make it possible to convert data into knowledge and then into business results. The balance of this paper will describe a model designed to help managers identify and diagnose the elements involved in building a strong analytic capability.
The business strategy at Harrah's Entertainment also had clear data implications. When the explosion of newly legalized gaming jurisdictions in the mid-1990s ground to a halt, Harrah's managers realized that growth could no longer come from the construction of new casinos. Rather, growth would need to come from existing casinos and from an increase of cross-market visitations between Harrah's 18 properties. Harrah's new strategy is to drive growth through customer loyalty and data-driven marketing operations. The implementation of this strategy requires the use of Harrah's extensive transaction data amassed on the gaming behaviors and resort preferences of existing customers.
Some firms may have defined formal performance metrics that are used to track the success of a defined strategy. If, for example, a company has developed its own version of a "balanced scorecard 9 ," it will be easily apparent what data needs to be compiled and summarized to assess the strategy. Other firms may employ another model for creating strategic value, e.g., the concept of "value-based management." At Dow Chemical, for example, the concept included a focus on measuring and maximizing shareholder value, understanding and allocating activity-based costs, and monitoring the profit contributions of different business segments (e.g., products, customers, or business units). Such pre-defined measurement models ease somewhat the task of ensuring the fit between data and strategy.
When the organization's strategy has not been clearly articulated and communicated by senior executives, it's still possible to build other aspects of a firm's analytic capability in the hope that eventually a compelling strategy will emerge. It will rarely be productive, however, to gather substantial amounts of data with the hope that some of it will eventually be useful.
Skills and Experience
Senior management often overlooks the unusual combination of skills and knowledge needed to transform data into actionable decisions. Not even the most sophisticated data mining software can obviate the need for a high degree of human skill and experience in the successful analysis and use of business data. The skills and experience needed to analyze transaction data are vastly different than the skill and experience needed to record transaction data. Moreover, thinking about decisions in analytic terms is very different from thinking about them based on prior experiences. These differences are profound enough that at least two companies in our study Crucial to the data-to-knowledge process are the contextual factors-those background elements that inform every decision. Decisions are not made in a vacuum, after all. They are made within the context of a particular business strategy, a particular experience and skills level, a particular culture and organizational structure, and a particular set of technology and data capabilities. Most companies, however, tend to focus on just two elements-technology and data-or none at all. By consciously addressing and improving each and every contextual element, however, managers can expect significant improvements in their analytic capabilities.
Strategy
Experience has taught us that strategy is often not addressed in the context of data access and analysis. Some may even question the need for it in this domain. However, without a strategic context, a company will not know which data to focus on, how to allocate analytic resources, or what it is trying to accomplish in a data-to-knowledge initiative. Providing a strategic business case for the data-to-knowledge initiative can also create support and be used to obtain funding. Finally, many of companies we spoke with, such as Kraft, First Union, and Citgo, emphasized that they actually gained deeper insight into the value drivers of their business as a result of tying data to strategic objectives. An analytic initiative can therefore actually improve the firm's insights into its own strategic position over time.
Managers should thus ask themselves the following strategic questions: What are our core business processes? What key decisions in those processes, and elsewhere, need support from analytic insights? What information really matters to the business? How will knowing something help the business perform better? What are the information and knowledge leverage points of the company's performance? These types of choices constitute the strategic context for turning data into knowledge.
When an organization's senior executives have clearly articulated what the strategy is, then the informational implications of it may be readily apparent. For example, a strategy that's heavily focused on improving profitability will likely lead to an orientation to customer, segment, and product profitability analysis. It was such a profitability-oriented strategy that lead Earthgrains to use its ERP data to understand the profitability of its retail customers and product lines. Besides cutting 20 percent of its product line, the company also stopped selling to about 25 percent of its lowest margin retailers who were unwilling to change their purchasing patterns.
Our research identified five key competencies that must be developed to varying degrees for each of these roles if a firm wants to build strong analytic capabilities. The competencies are outlined below. For a more detailed description of the specific skills and experience needed for each role, see Exhibit A.
Technology Skills
Database administrators must have deep knowledge of the core technical system. Business analysts and data modelers, who work with decision-makers to frame business problems and produce analytic outputs, need working knowledge of a variety of software tools, such as analytic packages and presentation software. Those making and implementing decisions will need to be comfortable with desktop browsers, query applications, and data interpretation and presentation software.
Statistical Modeling and Analytic Skills
Firms that want to use causal or predictive business models for planning or forecasting decisions will find that the ability to select and apply appropriate analytic and statistical techniques to business decisions is critical. Also important is the ability to interpret and present findings and limitations of specific statistical analyses. Data modelers will need sophisticated modeling and statistical techniques such as data visualization, regression analysis, categorical data analysis, and neural networks in order to design and build models. Business analysts, while needing less sophisticated modeling skills, must nevertheless be able to understand the model's constraints, run models, and assess the results. Decision-makers, while not needing to be proficient in statistics, need to understand the underlying analysis so that they can properly interpret and act on the findings.
Knowledge of the Data
Understanding the sources, relationships, and meaning of data elements is often an overlooked but highly critical competency that is central to getting business value from electronic data. Although more important for the business analyst and data modeler, the decision-maker should be aware of these issues. A deep understanding of how the data is produced and transformed often only comes from experience in working with the database. Much of this knowledge is tacit, changeable, and idiosyncratic, but without it the value found it easier to recruit and build staff from the outside rather than try to retrain existing staff.
Recruiting, developing, and retaining highly skilled employees with analytic capabilities is in fact a major human resource challenge for organizations that seek to transform transaction data into knowledge and results. Almost two-thirds of the companies we studied specifically raised this issue. Unfortunately, retaining analysts within a company's bureaucratic compensation structure is often difficult. To overcome this, many managers spend a lot of time building strong personal relationships with their analysts and modelers.
The specific skills and experience which we found to be essential for transforming data into knowledge depend, of course, upon individual roles and responsibilities. They also vary with the scope and sophistication of the analytic capability. No one individual can possess all the skills and experience necessary to transform data into knowledge. Rather, specialized roles work together to achieve this transformation. The four key roles we observed are as follows:
ness. This can help reduce the cost of turnover by building in redundancy.
Communication/Partnering Skills
The most sophisticated analyses in the world are worthless if findings can't be communicated to decision-makers in a way that will encourage their use. Likewise, if decision-makers can't communicate their needs to analysts, modelers, and outcome managers, or if IT database administrators can't communicate with data modelers for that matter, then the entire 
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It can take an analyst a year or longer to know the data in a large system. "Roger has been here 15 years and has lived through all the data transitions," said one manager of marketing information. "He knows the tribal lore. We rely on him to understand the data, and it's all in his head." Such an employee would obviously be difficult and costly to replace.
Knowledge of the Business
Designing, producing, and presenting analytic outputs is also dependent on extensive contextual knowledge of the particular industry involved and the business issues that the decision-makers are concerned with. Although knowledge of the business is obviously essential for the decision-maker and outcome manager, it is also imperative for the data modeler and business analyst. Such knowledge enables the modeler and analyst to effectively access data as well as translate and refine decision-makers' queries. "You can't get the data out of the data warehouse until you know the business," said a vice president for one major bank. "You need a kind of deep knowledge of our business processes, like how the ATM system works, for example, in order to know how that data is created."
Sometimes companies have to sacrifice business expertise in certain analytic positions. Because analysts and modelers with technical and analytic skills are in such short supply, companies often have to hire people without industry knowledge. First Union, for example, hired analysts with manufacturing, not banking, experience. Also, some companies such as Bank of America encourage analysts and modelers to develop a broad, rather than deep, knowledge of the busi- The following are some suggestions on how to develop the skills and experience needed to transform data into knowledge and then into results.
C Co on ns si id de er r h hi ir ri in ng g f fr ro om m t th he e o ou ut ts si id de e r ra at th he er r t th ha an n r re et tr ra ai in ni in ng g f fr ro om m t th he e i in ns si id de e. . Since data-to-knowledge initiatives are so different than other types of initiatives, it is often helpful to hire people already experienced in such processes. Some companies however, such as Kraft, were able to successfully reassign and educate existing IT professionals to work in their new technical environment.
E Ed du uc ca at te e b bu us si in ne es ss s--o or ri ie en nt te ed d p pe eo op pl le e a ab bo ou ut t d da at ta a, , a an nd d d da at ta a--o or ri i--e en nt te ed d p pe eo op pl le e a ab bo ou ut t b bu us si in ne es ss s. . Bank of America successfully educated its marketing staff about data modeling through holding carefully crafted educational forums. Other companies have taken a less formal approach by intentionally creating environments where intense informal communication can take place. "My team spent a year sitting next to the people developing our data warehouse, so they could understand how it goes together," said the vice president of customer data management and analysis at Fleet Bank. This group of reporting analysts still has a 20-minute daily conference call with the technical team that updates the database every night.
T Te ea ac ch h c co om mm mu un ni ic ca at ti io on n a an nd d p pr re es se en nt ta at ti io on n s sk ki il ll ls s, , n no ot t j ju us st t t te ec ch h--n no ol lo og gy y s sk ki il ll ls s. . Knowing how to communicate analytic insights effectively may require training in consultative selling and data presentation techniques. At Kraft Foods, a "business template" in slide format was constructed to help sales representatives communicate the results of complex analyses to grocery managers in a clear, compelling and concise manner.
with analytic resource constraints in their own units than deal with constraints imposed by a centralized group." Another manager at First Union Bank foreshadowed this evolving relationship between analysts and decision-makers, saying: "The whole objective of training managers to access the data is to get people to do their own analysis and queries, so we can focus on deeper analysis. Then when they do come to us for assistance, their use of the system means they have a better understanding of the data."
Both centralization and decentralization have their trade-offs. On the one hand, decentralization allows the analyst to better understand the business, the data, and the decision-makers themselves. On the other hand, if companies go too far with decentralization, they can lose the cutting edge knowledge that may come from a more centralized group. This may reduce an organization's chance of attracting top flight analysts who are inevitably drawn to working with the most sophisticated groups. Some companies have established processes that help counter the negative aspects of one extreme or the other. Unofficial "knowledge expediters" can direct knowledge to areas of the business that will benefit. At Harley Davidson, for example, a marketing executive helps external researchers studying customer behavior link up with different parts of the business, such as product development, that would benefit from his research. Other firms rotate their analysts over time through particular lines of business. This benefits the firm because insights can be shared and leveraged across business units. It also often benefits the analysts, as a variety of assignments can help shape or advance their career opportunities.
An alternative to decentralizing or centralizing analytic resources is to simply outsource or partner to gain analytic capabilities. Kraft Foods managers, for example, decided that the most effective way to develop a strong analytic capability was to enter into a partnership with a leading market information supplier. This relationship is carefully structured as a partnership rather than a simple outsourcing arrangement, and includes performance metrics, evaluation processes, and an advisory board composed of senior executives from both companies. For Kraft, the partnership has successfully streamlined analytic processes and enabled new analytic capabilities.
The information supplier has also benefited from the partnership, for it has lead to the creation of new products such as the Hispanic data panel.
Creating a data-oriented or fact-based culture data-to-knowledge process is at risk. A director of decision support for a consumer goods company says his biggest problem is getting business analysts to present their findings to product managers in ways that they will be understood and accepted as useful. The analysts tend to present their forecasting numbers as "the truth" and the only numbers managers should use, he said. Rather, he would have liked them to present a range of numbers, explain the probabilities, and leave it to the managers to decide.
Managers of firms seeking to build analytical capabilities should diagnose the level and structure of skills needed to support their organization's data analysis capabilities. If the skill levels of the data analysts in an organization don't meet needs, then a firm can't be getting full value from its transaction data.
Organization and Culture
By far the most neglected aspect of extracting value from transaction data-and one of the most important factors in building a firm's analytic capabilities-is the organizational and cultural context needed to support the new activities. In fact, in one informal survey we did, over 62% of the managers responding indicated that organizational and cultural factors were the greatest barriers to achieving a significant return on their ERP investment. Although difficult to change, we found that the most successful companies had both created organizational structures and a culture and value system that supported data-based analytic decisions.
Structuring Analytic Resources
Where should analytic resources be located in a company? Should they be centralized, decentralized, or even outsourced? About 45% of the companies in our study had predominately centralized analytic groups. Almost a third of the firms had analysts working primarily in decentralized business units or functions, while about 25% of the companies had analysts and modelers working in both centralized and decentralized units.
We suspect that the current emphasis on centralized groups is a reflection of the fact that most firms are in the early stages of developing data-to-knowledge capabilities. Eventually, we predict that the distribution of analytic resources will be more balanced. One vice president of database marketing and analysis explained: "Over time the pressure will be to decentralize these resources because managers would rather deal zational, cultural, and experiential factors that can help a company maximize its technology and data quality initiatives.
The successful companies that participated in our research had many different technologies and unique approaches to their technical architecture. These technology products and tools are amply discussed by vendors and the media. Since we feel that technology and data are already overemphasized at the expense of other important contextual factors, we will focus this section on the human performance implications of the technology and data context. It is these, we found, that truly set some companies apart from the pack.
Technology Context
Technology includes the specific hardware and software used in data capture, cleaning, extractions, and analysis, as well as the networking and infrastructure capabilities needed to transfer data and provide end-user access. Appendix B proCreating a culture that values data-based decision-making is an ongoing and highly challenging task. Yet it is vitally important to maximizing an organization's analytic capabilities. Without such a culture, an organization will almost certainly fail somewhere in the process of transforming data to knowledge and then into results. Without solid values underlying analytic efforts, an organization will all too easily neglect the already difficult to sustain capabilities necessary for success.
In an ideal situation, a data-to-knowledge effort will be seen as a natural extension of the way a company does business. No where was this more apparent than at Wachovia Bank. One executive vice president there explained how data and information were part of the intrinsic value system of the firm, saying "Wachovia's competitive position depends upon our ability to use information faster and smarter than our competition."
Not all companies value data-based analysis and decisions as Wachovia does, however. Senior management in one firm, for example, wanted its sale force to analyze purchasing history data to help their customers improve ordering and inventory management practices. The salespeople, however, were much more comfortable building and maintaining personal relationships with the customers' purchasing managers, so they resisted using the data to help customers make better supply chain-related decisions. Thus even if one area of an organization values data (the senior management in this case), the value system rarely permeates all levels of an organization. For an analytic capability to really succeed, the entire organization will need to value data-based analysis and decision-making, and the outcomes that result from it.
Technology and Data
Two related aspects of the context for turning data into knowledge and results are the technology and data environments of the organization. During the course of our study, we consistently found that companies spent the majority of their time, energy, and money in these two areas. This should come as no surprise, however, for it is only after an organization's technology has produced high-quality data that an organization will be able to analyze and use the data as a basis for sound decision-making.
Despite the heavy focus on technology, however, most organizations tend to neglect two important technology and datarelated areas. First of all, they tend to put too much emphasis on transaction-oriented technologies and not enough on analytic technologies. Secondly, they neglect some of the organi- ships they observed. The companies in our study were focused on leveraging the effectiveness of skilled managers, not on eliminating them.
Data Context
Our interviews showed that creating and maintaining a highquality data context is a difficult, costly, and never-ending vides a graphic overview of the technologies necessary to build a strong analytic capability.
Since analytic technologies are fundamentally different than the transaction technologies that most organizations are intimately familiar with, establishing an integrated technical architecture for analytic capabilities can be difficult. First of all, the management activities that analytic technologies support are very different from the activities required to process transactions. Because management activities such as planning, analyzing, decision-making, and exploring new ideas are often unstructured and poorly understood by IT professionals, managers' requirements are often ignored, distorted or minimized. Little consideration is given to management's information requirements until long after the transaction system is designed. As a result, management information is often little more than a by-product created by summarizing data gathered for transactions.
Secondly, the methods, skills and assumptions needed to develop the technical infrastructure for an analytic capability are different as well. The training and experience of most IT professionals is geared towards building efficient transaction systems. For example, although an IT professional may be able to interview an order entry clerk to determine the steps and data needed to "place a order," it will probably be much more difficult for this person to determine the sequence of events and data needed to "analyze our customer base." Unlike the order entry process, there are several possible routes to achieve this end. Even more difficult is the need to anticipate less structured analyses, such as "why are sales so volatile?" Moreover, the ability to choose and integrate analytic technologies is a rare and difficult skill, since a bewildering number of complex and unfamiliar hardware and software products are available that differ considerably from transaction systems.
Another difference between transaction systems and analytic technologies is that whereas the former generally require little human involvement, the latter most often require a lot. While some vendors might still argue that new technologies can "automate" many analytic activities, the companies in our study disagree. Analytic tools such as data mining are most effective when they are guided by human insight. We found that the most successful firms in our study-those that had the most pervasive data-based culture, and those that were most regularly making effective use of data in decision-making-had employed similar tactics to build a data-based culture. They are as follows:
C Cu ul lt ti iv va at te e e ex xe ec cu ut ti iv ve e s sp po on ns so or rs sh hi ip p. . Obtaining high-level support for analytic initiatives is one of the best ways to create a databased culture. U S WEST took an important step toward developing such a culture when a database manager created executive support for a customer relationship management initiative by tying it to the firm's overall strategy. The executives even began touting their evolving data-to-knowledge capabilities to Wall Street analysts as a source of competitive advantage for the firm.
S St ta ar rt t w wi it th h a an n u un nd de er rs st ta an nd di in ng g o of f e ex xi is st ti in ng g n no or rm ms s a an nd d p pr ra ac ct ti ic ce es s. . Understanding what the prevailing values are before one begins to try to change the culture can help immeasurably. If, for example, the sponsor of change in the firm trying to use purchasing data recognized that the sales force valued personal relationships so highly, it would have been much easier for him to address the culture change.
S St ta ar rt t s sm ma al ll l. . Spurring culture change at a company like Bank of America, which has 180,000 employees11, is much more difficult than trying to promote culture change at a small, Internet based firm like ShopLink, which employs less than 200 people. To maximize efforts at large, more traditional firms, we suggest focusing analytic initiatives in particular functions, such as marketing, or in specific units that are more receptive. By starting small, an organization can build momentum over time.
struggle that nevertheless must be waged. Not only might decision-makers shy away from making data-based decisions if good quality data is not available to them, but end-users might lose confidence in data-based analyses and decisions if they believe that the data is suspect. This can completely undermine the ability to achieve results from a data-toknowledge effort.
Maintaining high levels of data quality -in terms of accuracy, completeness, reliability, accessiblity, currency, and comprehensiveness -is also quite costly in monetary terms, however. According to industry estimates, 60 -80% of the total cost of a data warehouse project is spent on cleaning up and integrating data from mainframe legacy systems and external sources. Upwards of three-fourths of the cost of a data warehouse project is associated with just transforming the data so that it is acceptable for analysis and reporting.
Some of the problems that lead to poor data quality include the following:
Inconsistent Definitions: To paraphrase an old semantics argument, a "customer" is not a "customer" is not a "customer." Within a large bank, for example, the retail customer is the individual or household; the institutional trust customer is often an institution or group; the corporate lending customer is a division or corporation; and the treasury or investment customer is very likely another financial intermediary. Cross-selling and cross-servicing in this type of environment becomes a near impossibility. Identifying and fixing inconsistent definitions is a major part of the data preparation process. The labor intensive process of mapping inconsistent data often taxes valuable corporate resources, for the process requires employees who have significant knowledge of the data and of the business.
Incomplete and Missing Data:
One of the goals of data warehousing is to build a composite picture of your customer, yet one of the realities of life in the warehouse is that source data is notoriously incomplete. Transaction feeds from mainframe applications, for example, typically lack an historical perspective, and rarely contain behavioral or demographic data related to life styles. Filling in the missing blanks, identifying external source files, and merging records is a very time consuming, very complex, and very expensive proposition.
Whether an organization is currently involved in a data-toknowledge initiative or just beginning to think about it, it is Here are some concrete suggestions to create a technical environment which will support, rather than impede, transforming your data into knowledge and results:
C Cr re ea at te e a an n I IT T s st tr ra at te eg gy y t th ha at t s su up pp po or rt ts s d de ec ci is si io on ns s a as s w we el ll l a as s t tr ra an ns sa ac c--t ti io on ns s. . By incorporating the needs of decision-makers into initial user requirements and by creating an IT infrastructure that supports analytic as well as transaction capabilities, organizations will have a stronger technology context to support data-to-knowledge initiatives. Questions such as whether or not to standardize on analytic tools and applications will need to be addressed.
M Ma ai in nt ta ai in n a a s st ta ab bl le e t te ec ch hn ni ic ca al l e en nv vi ir ro on nm me en nt t t to o t th he e e ex xt te en nt t p po os ss si ib bl le e. . Many companies in our study cited the rapid pace of technology change as being a major obstacle to learning and embracing new technologies. Some organizations we studied sometimes intentionally held back new capabilities until users asked for them. Others resisted the temptation to continually upgrade their technical environments in order to give their users a more stable environment.
M Ma at tc ch h t te ec ch hn ni ic ca al l s so op ph hi is st ti ic ca at ti io on n t to o b bu us si in ne es ss s n ne ee ed ds s. . Resist the temptation to give every user infinite access and unlimited options for every business problem. Although performing a complex analysis may require a sophisticated and highly integrated analytic environment, communication of the analysis must be done with a technology appropriate for decision-makers and the issues at hand. At Kraft Foods, for example, highly skilled analysts used one tool set to perform category management analysis but standard slide presentation template to communicate the analysis.
I In nt te eg gr ra at te e d de ec ci is si io on n--m ma ak ki in ng g w wi it th h b bu us si in ne es ss s p pr ro oc ce es ss se es s. . Linking data, analytic tools and a transaction-based process into a single "application" can help ensure that decisions are executed consistently and that the desired outcomes are achieved. For example, if sales forecasts and manufacturing plans share common data and applications, a manufacturer can do a much better job managing supply and demand. Involving end-users early in the design process is critical to successfully tying decision-making into an operational process.
L Le et t t th he e s st tr ra at te eg gi ic c v va al lu ue e o of f d de ec ci is si io on ns s d dr ri iv ve e ' 'm ma ak ke e o or r b bu uy y' ' c ch ho oi ic ce es s. .
Deciding whether or not an analytic application lends your organization a competitive advantage can greatly simplify the 'make or buy' choice. Although some companies in our study were unwilling to buy standard software because they believed that proprietary software gave them significant advantage, many other companies with common decision activities decided to use pre-built applications (e.g., credit scoring, capital budgeting, and profitability analyses) and tailor them to specific business requirements.
The analytic process involves the means by which data becomes knowledge. The process is essentially a transformation of quasi-finished data (quasi because there is often more cleaning, massaging, and augmenting of data necessary during the process) into useful insights and knowledge. It may involv statistical analysis, generation and testing of hypotheses, construction of mental or mathematical models, relating databased knowledge to that derived from human interactions, and many other approaches and techniques.
The analytic process varies considerably based on the level of structure of the question that the data is designed to answer.
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Variables that change depending on the question's level of structure include the decision-maker's level of involvement, the need for highly skilled analysts, and the degree of technology and automation that can be employed in the process. What may initially seem to be a highly structured question (such as "to whom should we mail the new product promotional materials in order to get the biggest response?") may be much less structured than it appears. What do we mean by "biggest response?" Is it the number of calls and/or return mail items from the promotional offering, the number of first time buyers, the dollar amount of purchases, or the total number of purchases? How might other ongoing promotions distort the response to the mailings? Are we talking about direct channels only, or indirect as well? The ambiguities in such questions can multiply quickly.
While the level of structure in the question is clearly a continuum, it is typical to break the continuum into three points, as we have done with the sample questions in Exhibit 2 and in the discussion below.
Highly-Structured Questions
Some questions are highly-structured, unambiguous, and straightforward. Such questions tend to have few and clearly defined variables. An analyst addressing a highly-structured question, for example, will most likely assume that the variables associated with the question (e.g., sales, state, quarter, or product X) have been defined by everyone in the organization in the same way. The data associated with such questions also tends to be easily accessible and easily interpreted. Answers are simply presented in the form of a list or report.
Analytic problems that pose highly-structured questions may still be very time consuming for analysts, but they are relatively uncomplicated and require few interactions with the not too early to start to get data fields in shape. Work done now will pay big dividends later in terms of reducing the costs and complexity of transforming raw data into useful results. Most importantly, a high-quality data environment will help build confidence and trust in actually using the results of sophisticated decision support tools.
The Transformation Process
At the center of the overall model are the processes by which data actually becomes knowledge and is applied in decisions and actions. The processes have two iterative and intertwined phases: the analytic process and the decision-making process.
The Analytic Process
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Firms can get started building a high-quality data environment by doing the following:
B Bu ui il ld d a a d di ic ct ti io on na ar ry y o of f k ke ey y t te er rm ms s. . Key terms such as customer, revenues, and expenses should be defined and understood in terms of the differences that may occur by product, division, geography, and time. The lack of a common language was so pervasive and troublesome at Texaco, for example, that the company embarked on a special initiative to develop consistent definitions on a global basis. The result was a dramatic reduction in miscommunication problems.
C Co on ns st tr ru uc ct t a a d da at ta a m ma ap p. . An organization should have a map that
shows what information comes from what sources and applications, how often the information is updated, and where to go to find what you are looking for. Hoffman-LaRoche, a major pharmaceutical firm, mapped all the information that is used in bringing a new drug through the regulatory approval cycle. The result for one new drug was a significant decrease in time to market.
A Ap pp po oi in nt t a a d da at ta au ua al li it ty y t te ea am m. . A dedicated data quality team can help to establish data quality standards as well as assess the consistency, accuracy, and completeness of data -including data from external sources. Although Hewlett-Packard did not establish a formal data quality team, the company did execute a worldwide initiative to establish customer data quality standards. This initiative resulted in a significant increase in overall accuracy, coverage, and completeness of information.
about interpretations and explanations of the data. Furthermore, the less likely it is that the process of analysis can be automated or turned over completely to computer systems. Analytic results of unstructured questions thus often come in the form of a presentation or memo that presents a project or study.
Semi-Structured Questions
But how does the analytic process work when the desired question falls in between these extremes? This characterizes many analytic situations, and has long been the focus of the "decision support" literature and technology. Our research suggests that the semi-structured analytic process is best described as a series of iterative steps that successively refine decision-maker. In some instances, the decision-maker alone directs the relatively structured analytic process. Decisionmakers often prefer to access the data themselves and to specify the form of analysis. Using a growing number of userfriendly software tools, managers today can instantly analyze data in ways that previously might have taken months to accomplish using complex queries and code. For routine analyses that support initiatives such as a balanced scorecard or a marketing campaign, a growing list of software specific applications will now guide managers step by step through the entire analytic and decision-making process.
Unstructured Questions
Other questions are more complex, exhibiting nearly the opposite attributes of structured questions. The decision-maker may not even have a specific question in mind, as he or she is instead looking for lessons or trends that can be gathered from the data. If there is a specific question to be answered, there is considerable ambiguity to the question itself and to definitions of its key variables. An analyst who receives an unstructured question must spend considerable time interacting with the decision-maker trying to clarify his or her real information needs and the nature of the decision involved. 13 The analyst will also spend time with the IT staff, asking such questions as: How do we define how a customer was acquired in the database? Do we track responses to our specific magazine ads? How long do we store those responses in the database?
With unstructured questions, it may be difficult and time-consuming to access data in the database, or even to decide what data is relevant. Multiple variables are usually involved, and extensive interpretation and analysis of the quantitative outputs is required to make them meaningful for decision-makers. Usually this involves the use of more sophisticated statistical tools; only the most sophisticated "data mining" tools, for example, can identify patterns in data without the specification of a hypothesis in advance. Even then, we found that a highly skilled analyst must tell the software where in the data to look, must be able to reject spurious relationships or patterns, and must interpret the findings for reasonableness and implications.
Analysis of unstructured questions can also involve summarizing and interpreting textual information (e.g., "Web farming" on the Internet 14 ), or even mere detailed observation by the human brain. The more unstructured the analysis, the more useful it is to validate a finding by talking with real people Data to Knowledge to Results · Page 14 ©2001 Accenture · Institute for Strategic Change · www.accenture.com/isc
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Given current customer profiles, to which customers should we mail our new catalog?
Which products did our customers purchase most frequently last month?
How much inventory do we have of product X?
What were sales last week in the Southwest region?
U Un ns st tr ru uc ct tu ur re ed d Q Qu ue es st ti io on ns s
What is the demographic and psychographic makeup of our potential high value customers?
Which hurts the bottom line more: inventory holding costs or hiring staff to handle frequent deliveries?
How effective was our last marketing campaign?
How do our customers migrate between segments?
S Se em mi i--S St tr ru uc ct tu ur re ed d Q Qu ue es st ti io on ns s
What is the most effective product and pricing mix for a specific product category?
What is the next logical product we should offer to specific customers?
How can we allocate our branch and ATM resources most effecanticipate resource needs as the organization's use of data becomes more sophisticated.
In one division of Hewlett-Packard, it took several years for managers and analysts to develop a solid working relationship. The relationship began when managers requested analysts' help in understanding their list of catalog subscribers. Customers (those who had bought from Hewlett-Packard in the past) were indistinguishable from sales representatives' suggestions for potential customers. And since the list of subscribers had grown but the budget had not, managers needed a way to identify and selectively target their customers. Once this business need was established, data files were collected and compared so that customer profiles could be developed to enable marketing resource allocation decisions. The analysts and managers had to spend considerable time together in meetings at the outset just to understand each other and how they were going to approach the problem at hand. Once the results of the analysis created successful new marketing campaigns, the profiling process was embedded in the division's marketing operations, and the models were continually updated. As decision-makers learned more about the database and its capabilities, they identified new problems and decisions that it could support. This increased the demand for analytic support. However, over time decision-makers realized that they could be more effective with direct access to the data to perform basic queries. And as they got to know the data better, they started asking more sophisticated questions. Analysts began to spend less time educating managers about the data and the database, and more time discussing the implications of analytic findings for the business.
As analysts and decision-makers work to answer semi-structured questions, tensions may arise, for the two groups may have different objectives, expectations, and time frames expected with regard to the business question. We observed such conflicts in one of the banks that participated in our research. After developing a retail customer product propensity model, the bank's analytic staff wanted to begin testing it. Their choice was to review the model in two or three counties that could be relied upon to represent the state's overall consumer. The marketing department, in contrast, was under management pressure to "get their numbers up." They wanted to conduct the pilot in two of the state's more populous counties, counties that also represented a larger share of bank retail revenues. The analytic team went along with marketing's preferences. Following a highly successful pilot, marketing managers were anxious to roll the model out on a broader regional basis. The analytic group resisted, arguing that the and approximate the decision-maker's business needs. The result of such a process is usually represented in the form of a model or simulation. Although these iterations may eventually lead to a more structured and routine analytic process that can be automated to some degree, early on semi-structured analyses are labor intensive for both analysts and decisionmakers. Indeed, one of the common concerns managers of analytic units shared with us was how best to allocate very limited staff resources to the semi-structured analytic process. "Everything we do today is very ad hoc," noted one manager. "The challenge is how to make a lot of our work routine. What we want to be able to do is to make successful models a part of our business, and get out of this ad hoc thing."
Typically, the semi-structured analytic process begins with a general understanding of the desired outcomes and business objectives. The decision-maker communicates these to the business analyst. Based upon this understanding, the analyst will then perform a preliminary assessment of data availability and develop a "proof of concept" model to review with the decision-maker. The preliminary model results in turn enable the analyst and decision-maker to identify various constraints such as data availability, data quality, model specification and model options as well as to provide additional clarification of the business objectives. More intensive development work on the model then follows. Throughout this latter step continuous involvement and interactions occur between the decisionmaker, the analyst, database specialists, and other key staff (e.g., product managers and individuals involved with implementation). The final steps in this process involve testing and validation, production (by this point the question has become structured and routine), and ongoing evaluation.
Effective analysts for this type of problem understand that decision-makers process information differently, depending on their orientation and cognitive styles. Thus, outputs must be packaged with appropriate mixtures of graphics and text to satisfy the particular audience. As one Fleet Bank analyst put it, "there are chart people and there are numbers people." had to design analytic outputs that satisfied both in order to communicate her findings.
A clear finding from our study is that managers and analysts addressing semi-structured questions view their interaction as an evolving relationship. In virtually all of the companies we looked at there was evidence that data-to-knowledge capabilities grew as the relationships between analysts and decisionmakers evolved. Understanding the implications of these evolving relationships is important for executives who must
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The decision-making process itself, largely invisible within the minds of managers, is difficult to understand, document, or improve. While it is at the center of the data-to-knowledge process, it may be the aspect of the process that is least subject to intervention. In our research we found only a few examples of any attempt to address data-driven decision processes.
Decisions may be based on high-quality, well-analyzed data or a multitude of other factors. Management scholars over the past several decades have documented the sometimes tenuous link between data, decisions, and actions, and have even described the decision process as being a "garbage can" model. 15 Managers may commonly eschew data altogether, model would have to be recalibrated for a totally different population. Commented one of the analysts on the team, "Marketing, however, did not want to hear this. They simply wanted to take the model and use it. They had no understanding or patience for our disciplined approach to the process."
Decision-makers are often surprised to find that as analytic processes mature and greater insights into the business are had, their sense of uncertainty and ambiguity increases. Once the easy wins and "low hanging fruit" are picked off, deeper insights tend to be produced that may cause decision-makers to confront fundamental beliefs about the organization's culture. For example, one bank discovered that some of its most profitable customers were not doctors, as they had always believed, but rather steady employees of a chain of pancake houses who did all of their financial business with the bank. This insight required new management decisions that contradicted some long held beliefs.
Different types of analyses can lead to different segmentations of users, process flows, and technologies. In First Union Bank's customer relations marketing group, different analytic approaches have been institutionalized into four distinct decision-maker segments. Each of the segments is supported by a common data mart (called SIGMA), but different applications software and capabilities are linked to each segment. At the highest level, senior managers were given direct desktop access to SIGMA Executive, an application enables decisionmakers to conduct their own simple queries (e.g., sales trends, profitability by geographical areas and products) and produce customized, graphical reports. SIGMA Explorer supports the next level down -product and marketing managers, for example. Like the Executive software, Explorer is relatively easy to use and is available from the manager's own desktop. The browser interface contains several decision support tools that enable decision-makers and managers to drill down through the data in more detail than is possible at the executive level. The third level of targeted users are analysts and campaign managers. Sigma Prospector supports their needs for generating targeted lists, assigning prospects to customized campaign groups, and tracking responses over time. The final level of users are high end modelers and analysts, individuals who are involved in sophisticated and highly customized data analytic techniques, e.g., data mining. The application software at this level is referred to as SIGMA Analyst, which supports very detailed manipulation and design of transaction files as well as broad range of statistical procedures.
The Decision-Making Process
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C Cr re ea at ti in ng g a an n E Ef ff fe ec ct ti iv ve e T Tr ra an ns sf fo or rm ma at ti io on n P Pr ro oc ce es ss s
Here are some ways that successful companies have created a stronger analysis and decision-making capability:
C Cr re ea at te e p pr ro oc ce es ss se es s t to o c cu ul lt ti iv va at te e a an na al ly ys st t/ /d de ec ci is si io on n--m ma ak ke er r r re el la at ti io on n--s sh hi ip ps s. . Since tension can easily arise between analysts and decision-makers, processes should be put in place to help make the relationship as smooth as possible. At least one of the companies we spoke with, decision-makers routinely discussed ongoing cases with the analysts on a weekly basis. Partly technical in nature, they also included case counseling reviews in which analysts offer advice on how to deal with difficult situations.
S St ta ar rt t w wi it th h a a b br ro oa ad d o or ri ie en nt ta at ti io on n t to o t th he e p pr ro ob bl le em m. . One analyst revealed that his "secret" in working with decision-makers was not to get too specific too quickly. His advice was to do an initial exploration of the business issue or decision at a high level, try to fit some data to the problem, and then go back to the decision-maker to get some feedback. As he put it, "...getting bogged down in the details up-front is guaranteed to keep you in the starting blocks."
C Co on ns si id de er r s se eg gm me en nt ti in ng g u us se er rs s, , p pr ro oc ce es ss s f fl lo ow ws s, , a an nd d t te ec ch hn no ol lo og gi ie es s b by y a an na al ly ys si is s t ty yp pe e. . This may help firms better use analytic resources, as they can be specialized to best serve each type of user.
ity were determined but never fully acted upon. Take the case of a bank we studied. After careful analysis, some bank managers realized that the bank would be more profitable if they closed some targeted branches. However, due to community opposition, the hesitation of laying off employees, and the need to end leases prematurely, they never acted on their insight. To avoid a situation in which a great deal of energy is devoted to suggesting a change that can't be made, desired outcomes and sources of constraints should be considered from the very beginning of an analytic effort. Outcomes may, for example, influence what data is brought to bear, how it is analyzed, or what decisions are made. Further, opposition or implementation difficulties that may be encountered can be planned for early in the process.
We've described the three types of outcomes in our model as behaviors, processes and programs, and financial results. For many companies, financial results may be all that matter in the end. However, they probably won't be achieved without gather it and not use it, or gather it, analyze it, and make decisions on other factors altogether.
However, if the results of data analyses are not used to inform decisions, then what is the point of capturing and managing the data in the first place? With some well structured problems, such as in the case of credit scoring models, this linkage may be automatic. A "yes" or "no" decision is rendered based on the model results. In other cases such as customer segmentation, the decision will require more active human intervention. The influence of the larger organizational and cultural context will play an important part in influencing just how this decision-making process is configured.
There has been a tendency for organizations to treat managerial decision-making as a "black box," subject neither to explanation nor review. But several of the companies we studied were beginning to consider more active intervention in decisions. One firm, for example, was trying to implement "decision audits," in which not only the result of the decision but the information and data used to inform it would be evaluated retrospectively. Another firm was planning to record decisions and later go back to evaluate them to consider what lessons might be learned. Still, these companies are at the very earliest stages of managing decisions, and the invisibility and irrationality of managerial decision-making makes it a very difficult area to address.
Outcomes in the Model
Context and transformation count for little unless something changes in the organization as a result. It may be tempting to think of the end of the process as the point at which a decision is made, or even the point at which the last piece of analysis is completed. After all, it's not normally the responsibility of data access and analysis functions to make datainformed strategic decisions, much less to carry them out. Indeed, all visibility seems to go to the outcomes -those changes that occur when a decision is implemented and the financial results that follow. That there were ever foregoing steps involving data and analysis may easily be forgotten.
Outcomes must be included in the model because they are what bring value to the whole endeavor. Neither analytic findings nor decisions themselves yield results; ultimately, it's the process of implementing a decision that determines its effect on business performance. We've observed several instances in companies where, for example, sources of increased profitabil-
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Here are several techniques that can improve the chances that successful outcomes will be achieved from a data-to-knowledge initiative. They apply to all of the outcomes that are described below.
I Id de en nt ti if fy y a an nd d d do oc cu um me en nt t o ou ut tc co om me es s f fr ro om m t th he e b be eg gi in nn ni in ng g. . Many companies we spoke with found documenting progress significantly increased the organization's commitment to achieving data-to-knowledge initiatives.
M Me ea as su ur re e t th he e b ba as se el li in ne e l le ev ve el l o of f b be eh ha av vi io or rs s, , p pr ro oc ce es ss se es s, , o or r f fi in na an n--c ci ia al l p pe er rf fo or rm ma an nc ce e. . Baseline measurements makes it possible to determine improvements from the initiative and lend the measurements credibility.
I Id de en nt ti if fy y s so om me e t ty yp pe e o of f " "c co on nt tr ro ol l g gr ro ou up p. ." " Even if it's only a business unit or group to which the initiative won't be applied, establishing a control group can help demonstrate value. First Union's control group, for example, helped establish its position that their the analytic initiative contributed $100 million to the organization.
M Me ea as su ur re e o ou ut tc co om me es s i in n a a b bu us si in ne es ss s a ar re ea a w wi it th h r re el la at ti iv ve el ly y l le es ss s c ch ha an ng ge e. . The rapid rate of change in the external business environment makes it more difficult to understand linkages between actions and outcomes. It will therefore be easier to measure outcomes where change is less pervasive.
attention to intermediate outcomes such as changes in behaviors and new processes or projects. It is these changes that implement the decision, or carry forth the decision into action. Financial outcomes ultimately measure the effectiveness of the decision and its implementation. These outcomes will often exhibit a close relationship, with financial results depending on new processes, which depend on new behaviors. However, this won't always be the case.
Behaviors
New or different behaviors by individuals within your organization (and sometimes those outside of it in the form of customers or suppliers) are usually necessary to get business value from data-to-knowledge decisions and capabilities. A data-based decision to focus on cost control, for example, can require thousands or millions of individual behaviors that work to curtail spending. If these behaviors don't occur, then the point of the analysis and the decision is questionable.
Acceptance or adoption of the results of an analytic model by managers alone does not deliver results. Ultimately, improved financial outcomes depend upon the actions of the employees who do the work. New behaviors are most likely when those who need to perform them have a clear reason for doing so. Those people "downstream" from the analytic process should thus know the results of the data-based analysis. For example, any program of customer or market segmentation involves a determination-based on data-of which customers are most profitable to serve. In order to achieve a successful outcome from segmentation, however, marketing and/or salespeople have to treat some customers differently than others. The most valuable customers must be given preferential treatment; the least valuable must be served less expensively or even "fired." Those serving the customers need not know the details of the analysis, but they must believe that it is credible. Other types of behavioral outcomes include reducing expenditures in companies when financial data analysis reveals excessive costs, switching suppliers to a preferred vendor, or cross-selling certain products to customers when analysis of data reveals that they would be likely to buy.
Processes or Programs
In order for data, analysis, and decisions to yield business value, most organizations will need to initiate process and program changes, or create new ones altogether. Often formed in part by an aggregation of behavior changes, process and 
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It should come as no surprise then that many of the factors that make for successful behavioral outcomes fall within the realm of organization and culture. Whereas the organizational and cultural context refers to those factors that serve as effective preconditions to analysis and decision-making, the following findings represent the organizational and cultural factors that help to make use of the decision and analysis once it has been made.
E Ed du uc ca at ti io on n a an nd d t tr ra ai in ni in ng g. . End-user behavior change often requires a carefully crafted education and training program. Long before the decision results were put into practice, one company spent 3-4 months rolling out an entire communications plan informing field staff and end-users about expected behavior changes. Such educational programs are often crucial to the success of data-to-knowledge initiatives. U Us se er r d di is sc cr re et ti io on n a an nd d f fe ee ed db ba ac ck k. . User involvement in the "production" version of the analysis not only increases user adoption of new behaviors, but often helps build credibility into the outcomes themselves. This happens when learning or feedback loops work to accommodate user suggested changes and refinements. In a banking model designed to identify "next logical products" to sell to targeted customers for example, managers found that incorporating end-user personalized information into the model was extremely important in terms of utilization and acceptance. Field and analytic staff worked together to provide a way in which this information could be fed back into subsequent analyses and decision results. V Va al li id da at ti io on n o of f t th he e o ou ut tc co om me es s. . Developing trust in the validity of analytic outputs is an important step in securing behavioral changes from other stakeholders. Analytic models, for example, will need to be repeatedly tested so as to demonstrate to users that the assumptions underlying the model are valid and that the outcomes can be believed. R Re ew wa ar rd ds s a an nd d i in nc ce en nt ti iv ve es s. . Existing incentive and compensation structures have to be properly aligned with the proposed behaviors, particularly where processes have been altered. At Earthgrains' Refrigerated Dough Division, the sales force had historically been rewarded only for the quantity of products sold. After the SAP system was implemented, however, the compensation was changed to reward salespeople 50 percent on sales volume and 50 percent on gross profit of their accounts. This significantly changed the behavior of the sales force, who became much more interested in using data to understand the current and potential profitability of their customers. P Po ol li it ti ic ca al l w wi il ll l. . Sometimes reward systems, education, and other such tactics aren't enough to motivate people to change their behavior, especially when the requested behavior changes are significant. Although difficult and politically risky, some organizations have actually removed those clinging to old behaviors and replaced them with those who can perform as desired. For example, executives in two companies we studied had replaced their entire marketing departments because employees were seen to be too trapped in the non-data oriented behaviors of the old culture. Another executive encouraged the removal of several IT and marketing directors who resisted the firm's data-to-knowledge initiative.
such cross-functional processes. The flow of work and information across different functions must be modeled and planned in advance if it is to happen seamlessly.
Financial Impacts
It is important to specify the desired financial outcomes from an analytic initiative, for they can work to measure the success of a data-to-knowledge effort. However, financial impacts shouldn't be sought by themselves (because they won't be found), but only as the end result of a variety of behavioral and organizational changes.
The possibilities for specifying financial results are relatively few, and may include improved profitability, higher revenues, lower costs, or improved market share or market value. Although increased revenue is a better value proposition, it is cost savings that usually sells a data-to-knowledge initiative, for it is much easier to specify in advance how savings will be achieved. Revenue increases, on the other hand, are difficult to predict and measure. Moreover, they are difficult to program changes may be seen as intermediate outcomes of a particular data-driven decision.
A program is a project that seeks to improve the business in some regard. Analysis of customer transaction data may reveal, for example, that a promotion isn't working, and that a new marketing initiative is needed. The programs needed may involve training of employees, communications about |the promotion to customers, salespeople, or other affected parties, even development of new computer systems to automate the process of using data to take action. Alternatively, new insights may even lead to the development of new products, such as a new investment fund for a newly identified customer group.
Business processes may also need modification or redesign. A determination that an existing process is not working effectively can lead to a new process design and to its implementation. If data analysis suggests that a new product development process takes too long, for example, decisions may be taken to shorten it incrementally or radically. In initiatives involving the objective of improved profitability, data analysis might also suggest the need to modify processes. Owens & Minor's data analysis, for example, revealed that profitability could be increased if supply chain processes were redesigned.
Like process reengineering efforts, analytic outputs resulting from the use of transaction data may require major changes in organizational structures, roles, and work processes in order to use new insights and capabilities provided by the system. Organizations will be particularly prone to such change if a process demands new skills and knowledge and increased coordination between operating groups. One director of relationship marketing we spoke with experienced an increased work load brought about by new analytic capabilities. An integrated data infrastructure and more efficient campaign management software had boosted the number of outbound marketing campaigns by 85%; one division alone is now doing 175 direct marketing campaigns a year. The director had to totally restructure her marketing team and the processes they used to set goals, execute, and evaluate the performance of their campaigns in order to handle it.
Another similarity to reengineering is that the initiatives resulting from data analysis are often cross-functional. A new process of serving customers, for example, may need to encompass several customer-facing functions, such as sales, marketing, logistics, and customer service. Certainly initiatives bent on improving cross-selling opportunities or determining customer segmentation based on profitability would involve Anticipate the need to change business processes and programs in advance. By knowing ahead of time what changes may be necessary to take full advantage of data-based capabilities, managers will be able to anticipate any opposition that may arise as well as plan for difficult to implement cross-functional processes.
Create effective conflict-handling behaviors. Process changes that require cross-functional collaboration between people with very different types of experience may cause conflict. Instituting ways to handle conflict ahead of time can significantly increase the chance that a cross-functional process change will succeed.
Obtain senior management and stakeholder support for your program or process change. Resistance to process or program changes is common. For example, a process designed to improve overall profitability may encounter opposition if it is instituted at the expense of an individual channel or product. To counter any opposition that may arise, and to ensure the successful implementation of your process or program change, appropriate support will be necessary.
Applying the Model in Practice
While the model described above is a useful tool for evaluating and building a general analytic capability, we found in our research that that there are generally several ways companies evolve their data-to-knowledge capabilities. In a multi-factor model such as this one, many companies need guidance in determining where to start and which paths are the most effective.
Most companies begin with the technological dimension of the problem. Although we feel that technology is often overemphasized in analytic efforts, we do believe that it makes sense to address one aspect of technology early on. Firms need to do an early assessment of whether or not they have a transaction data environment that is sufficiently robust and of sufficient quality to provide data for decision-making. If the basic data platform is not good enough, it makes sense to begin putting a new one in place-a process that can easily take several years. It doesn't make sense to worry about the details of turning data into knowledge if the data isn't worthwhile to begin with.
For example, many companies have installed new enterprise systems from SAP, Oracle, PeopleSoft, and other vendors over the past several years. The goal of these systems is to provide exactly the sort of integrated, cross-functional, high-quality data that could eventually be used in management decisions and actions. If a company is only at the beginning of installing such a system, or even earlier in the process, any thoughts about turning such enterprise data into knowledge should be postponed. At Dow Chemical, for example, efforts to install one of the first SAP systems in the United States began in the late 1980s. An initiative to turn the SAP data into knowledge didn't begin in earnest until the mid-1990s, when substantial amounts of the SAP transaction data had become available.
Assuming that the organization has some data with which to work, there is another critical factor to assess before getting into the finer points of data transformation. It is an aspect of both the strategic and organizational contexts-whether or not senior executives are interested in data-based decision-making. If they're not, no amount of data or knowledge is likely to change their minds, and the process of using data to manage the organization will at best be tactical. Middle managers who want to build the organization's analytic capability, but who lack supportive executives, are advised to do small projects that demonstrate the value of data-based decisions, or to wait for a more receptive climate.
attribute to an analytic effort since many people are eager to take credit for revenue generation.
However they are attributed, we found many examples of companies that had succeeded in pinning financial results to specific data-to-knowledge initiatives. Fleet Bank saved $3-4 million dollars when a new market optimization model relying on usage pattern and market demand variables helped executives decide which branches to close. Fleet also exceeded its costs savings goal of $12 million in 1999 as a result of its Changing Channels program, which encouraged customers to switch from more costly channels such as branch banking to less costly ones such as ATMs and Internet banking. This program was an outcome of careful transaction data analysis. Earthgrains also tied substantial savings to its data-to-knowledge initiative: it revealed a $5 million a year savings obtained by using transaction data analysis to resolve a greater share of invoice disputes with retail grocery chains in their favor. We found the following strategies useful in helping companies attribute financial results to data-to-knowledge efforts:
Data to Knowledge to Results
Narrow the financial analysis. Since improved financial results will usually have many competing explanations, it's often useful to narrow the financial analysis so that data-derived improvements don't get lost in the shuffle. Revenue or profit analysis should be restricted to the business units, product or service lines, or geographies to which the data-to-results initiative applies. Segmentation programs should be measured with regard to the costs, profits, or revenues from serving a specific segment. Initiatives that don't directly involve financial outcomes, including human resource management programs, can still be measured in financial termse.g., a higher level of retention should translate into subsequent reductions in recruiting costs.
Substantiate financial results with behavioral and process outcomes. Although it may be easy to specify the financial outcomes, it isn't always easy to convince people that faster or better decisions translate directly into financial outcomes. The credibility of financial outcomes will be enhanced if there is evidence of improvement for all types of outcomes. It may be difficult to draw a direct chain of influence (from context to transformation to nonfinancial outcomes to financial outcomes), but establishing that linkage should always be the objective of an organization that invests effort and resources in using its transaction data.
very concerned about managing the organizational changes needed to implement data-driven decisions and developing and maintaining a quality data infrastructure. Finally, senior management pushed to expand the use of the bank's evolving analytic capabilities into other parts of the business.
In contrast, several of the firms we studied were simply doing data analysis, with other issues either left for line managers to address or not dealt with at all. We predict that this analyticcentric approach will limit positive outcomes for organizations going this route; we saw evidence that some of these firms are already running into implementation and organizational change issues that they had not anticipated.
For a firm to really capitalize on its analytic capability, it should ultimately position itself in the upper right quadrant of the matrix in Figure 2 . A firm would then have both a broad, generic approach to data-driven problem solving combined with a holistic approach to the strategic and organizational concerns raised by data-driven analysis. Perhaps because this requires long term support from knowledgeable senior executives, we didn't find many companies in this situation.
Summary
Since the beginning of computing in business, organizations of all types have been generating transaction data. While a primary purpose of the data was always supposed to be to inform management decision-making (the function that managed technology thus evolved from "Data Processing" to "Management Information Systems"), this goal has never been fully realized. Firms have purchased the technologies that enable transformation of These two factors-a suitable transaction data environment and supportive senior executives-are go/no go factors in actively pursuing a broad data-to-knowledge initiative. If they're both present, the organization should proceed with haste. In our research we observed four different options for proceeding. The matrix of the options is displayed in Figure 2 .
The options involve the breadth of implementation of the process and the primary focus of the effort. In terms of breadth, some firms we observed undertook a broad program of data-based analysis, building a general capability that could address multiple business problems and potentially serve the entire enterprise. Kraft Foods, in its alliance with a marketing information supplier, sought to build such a generic capability that could address a variety of business issues related to marketing and customer relationships. Similarly, Fleet Bank built a corporate analytic group with more than 50 analysts to deal with a variety of data-derived knowledge types. The danger, of course, is that these generalized groups will be unresponsive to business needs and will take on their own objectives that differ from those of the business. We did not observe this problem in the companies we researched that had broad approaches, however. Instead, their biggest problem tended to be a shortage of human resources to meet the demands of the business.
The other approach relative to breadth is to address a single business problem, with no immediate concern for the entire organization's data analysis needs. Hewlett-Packard's Electronic Measurement Division used the data-to-knowledge process just to address the issue of maximizing catalog sales to customers. Harrah's was focused on the single issue of customer loyalty and making effective promotions to customers. Of course, it's possible that firms with a single focus on the analytic function will later broaden their approach, or that those with a broad, general approach will narrow theirs. In our research snapshot, however, we observed these two different approaches.
The other dimension of the matrix in Figure 2 involves the primary focus of a data-to-knowledge initiative. Is it almost exclusively on data management and analysis, or is there a broader, more holistic approach addressing not only datadriven analysis, but also issues of business strategy, organizational change, and behavioral and financial outcomes? At Wachovia Bank, for example, the focus was clearly on the more holistic approach. Wachovia's analytic capabilities were tightly linked with its overall business strategy and were supported by a data-oriented culture. In addition, executives were data into knowledge, but the human component necessary for this process has been given short shrift.
Our research suggests that the companies that succeed at dataderived analysis and decision-making make it part of the broader fabric of the organization. It is aligned with their strategies, their processes, and the behaviors of their employees. It is driven by senior executives' appetite for facts. And it is undertaken with specific business problems and objectives in mind.
The need for turning transaction data into knowledge and results is not going to go away. If anything, it will become more important. As basic business processes become more automated, we'll have an even greater need to transform the data they generate into meaningful results. Some of the data analysis can itself be done in an automated fashion, and some results can even be turned into decisions and actions without direct human intervention. These will be only the most routine decision processes, however.
For the most important decisions, concerted human attention will continue to be necessary. As transaction data proliferates, the question of where to allocate scarce human attention will become a pressing problem. It is then that a broader analytic capability will be crucial to success. The ability to frame data collection and use within a larger strategic purpose will thus become more and more important. By applying our framework and starting now to develop broad analytic capabilities, companies can more readily prepare themselves for the deluge of data that is here and is bound to get worse.
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Appendix A: Skills Matrix response to increased scope and scale of work. In other cases, the organizational structure had evolved in a way that encouraged greater role differentiation and skill depth, such as the creation of separate business analyst and data modeler roles.
The skills matrix below is meant to show an ideal set of skills and experiences for each role in an organization. Less than half the companies we studied, however, had such fully developed roles. Many of the companies were in the process of developing these roles. In some cases, roles were evolving in W believe that there are four different types of technologies needed to fully support a data-to-knowledge capability.They are described below and illustrated on the following page.
1. Transaction Data Systems.Obviously,transaction systems are a major source of data.They are the starting point of the data-to-knowledge transformation.The quality and level of integration of these systems is a critical aspect of the technology context. Data-Oriented Culture. The division's president was known by his colleagues as being data hungry. When he observed the information available from SAP, he noted enthusiastically, "It's like getting your head blown off with data." He had pushed hard to develop norms that would encourage employees to make more data-driven decisions. In recent years, the quality of management reviews had improved 100 percent, according to one senior manager, because executives were now much more reliant on numbers in explaining their performance and investments. This behavior had trickled down throughout the organization, so that sales people were pushed to become users of data. Management assumed that if the sales force worked with the numbers themselves, they would be more confident about the ideas they were presenting to customers.
Skills and Knowledge Context
A variety of skills and knowledge are needed to leverage transaction data for decision-making. At Earthgrains, both the customer service and sales departments have teams of analysts whose combined skills include: Detailed knowledge of the unit's underlying business processes. Strong knowledge of the grocery industry. Extensive skills for interpreting the meaning of the SAP data, which requires understanding definitions of key elements, how they relate, and their limitations for analysis.
Strategic Context
The company's U.S. Refrigerated Dough Division is the only manufacturer of private-label refrigerated dough products in the U.S. The company makes canned dough products that are sold in the grocery refrigerated section, including biscuits, an assortment of rolls, cookie dough, breadsticks, pie crusts, and pizza crust. Dough products are marketed nationwide under more than 100 store brands.
The Refrigerated Dough Division competes primarily with Pillsbury, which, as the only branded manufacturer of refrigerated dough, dominates the category. Earthgrains' strategy is to copy Pillsbury's successful products with private label offerings and to capture significant volume in the particular product. Operating margins are more than 10%, as compared with approximately 5% in the Bakery Division.
Senior managers in the U.S. Refrigerated Dough Products unit chose to pursue a strategy of operational excellence, as opposed to taking a customer or product focus. However, although the management team recognized what types of decisions had to be made in order to support strategy, the division lacked the operational data it needed to make these decisions and measure their effectiveness. Historically, the division had no integration between its order-to-cash, picking, delivery, and accounts receivable processes and systems. There was also no visibility into finished goods inventory if a customer had a question. And the company couldn't price an order until it was shipped, which significantly delayed the invoicing process. In addition, product forecasting efforts were hampered, and the company had difficulty determining manufacturing capacity. On the sales side, management also had limited visibility of the most and least profitable customers and products. In general, management lacked the detailed understanding of what its business needed to improve operations.
Organizational and Cultural Context
Earthgrains exhibited some organizational and cultural factors that helped support the use of transaction data.
ferent types of users means everything in getting it used. In addition, special decision support software may also be needed for particular applications. Earthgrains loads data files into Manugistics, a supply chain planning and forecasting software package, which they use for analysis in a variety of ways.
Technology Support Budget. Any organization trying to leverage transaction data for decision-making needs ongoing technical support as the number of applications and the volume of data continues to grow. Successful use of data is likely to create demand for other applications. Earthgrains' CIO said that management had underestimated the resources needed to support the ongoing rollout of new SAP modules. He explains, "Managing the technical platform is a constant juggling act. We have to keep adding application servers and disc space."
Data Context
Relevant data issues will vary significantly across organizations, but Earthgrains illustrates several factors that can impede the use of data for decision-making.
Controlling Data Integrity. The ability to develop and maintain "clean" data is always important, but acceptable error rates will vary across functions and industries. Integrity was less of a problem in Earthgrains' Refrigerated Dough Division where transaction data captured in the SAP system was created internally based on sales orders and shipping invoices. While management could control these processes, the company's Bakery Division was trying to use scanner data from grocery stores to transform its distribution processes. Data from many retailers, however, had proved to be of variable unacceptable quality, limiting its usefulness. Clearly, it is easier to control the quality of transaction data created within an organization than across entities.
Synthesizing Data from Other Sources. SAP transaction data must almost always be integrated with data from other sources, such as third party vendors, to make it useful for management decision-making. Earthgrains used census data combined with scanner data to analyze trends in different product categories, and to try to interpret what was happening in the marketplace.
Completeness of Data.
To be useful, transaction data must include the data elements of fields that can be usefully compared to provide insights for decision-making. For example, if the system captures data on product sales, but the specific item cannot be linked back to the specific promotion under Thorough working knowledge of several analytic and data presentation software packages. Strong interpersonal skills needed to train and support end users, particularly the sales people who were likely to become frustrated when they started working with the data.
Technology and Data Context
Earthgrains' lack of operational data to support decision-making changed with the implementation of SAP's R/3. Most of the ERP system's modules had been implemented by early 1999. The Refrigerated Dough Division now has unprecedented visibility into its operations and customer base, which has dramatically changed its operations. Several modules had also been installed in the Bakery Division, but so far, deployment there had been more limited. In addition to the hardware and software technologies needed to create, capture and store the transaction data used to support decision-making, several other technology elements are present:
Data Communications. When transaction data crosses organizational boundaries, the communications technology needed to transfer the data between entities becomes an important factor. Earthgrains had invested considerable resources to develop its electronic data interchange (EDI) capabilities.
Data Access Tools.
Earthgrains has given its 28-member sales force laptops to access highly detailed sales data now available through the system. This access tool enables access to SAP data, but also constrains the types of questions analysts and managers can ask. For example, the vice president of customer services says, "SAP is good if you want to look at order X by customer by day, but it's very hard to use if you want to see five customers over three days."
Data access tools are probably the most visible example of software or hardware capabilities that can impede the use of transaction data. But other technical capabilities must also be present to support the data's use. For example, initially, Earthgrains' sales people who work remotely couldn't print any SAP outputs because they were not part of the company's computer network at headquarters. If not anticipated and resolved, the use of transaction data can be inhibited by technical barriers. Analytic Modeling. Although Earthgrains in general had made limited efforts in this area, they had begun forecasting product demand to better plan their manufacturing capacity.
Data Analysis and Presentation
One-Time Process Analysis. The integration of SAP data also supported one-time process analyses. For example, Earthgrains evaluated the cash disbursements going through its accounts payable process in its Bakery Products Division, thereby providing support for a management decision to centralize all accounts payable activities from its 44 bakeries.
Decision-Making Processes
Different analytic capabilities support different types of decisions and decision-making processes. Access to transaction data, and the ability to interpret and analyze it, can change:
(1) the types of decisions being made; (2) the confidence management has in making certain ongoing decisions; and (3) even the location of some decisions within a business process.
New Types of Decisions. At Earthgrains, SAP data made it possible to identify which customers and products were most and least profitable. It is worth noting that while the data analysis revealed unprofitable customers and products, the more important management decision was what to do with those results and how to do it. Managers may gain new insights by speculating about what decisions are not currently being made that would add considerable value, if they became practical.
Increasing Confidence in Decisions.
Using transaction data effectively sometimes means making decisions that were not possible before, but other times means changing the confidence level in decisions already being made. SAP data at Earthgrains provided new levels of confidence and support in making decisions about where to invest in promotions, where to invest in manufacturing capacity given expected product demand, and where sales managers should be focusing their attention.
Changing Decision-Making Processes. Finally, the availability of transaction data also sometimes enables major changes in decision-making processes and, notably, where decisions are being made. At Earthgrains, two processes were changed in distinctly different ways. The accounts payable process was centralized and standardized so that all invoices were paid after 28 days. In this case, payables decisions were not only shifted away from local bakeries, but they were also embedded in a series of decision rules that virtually automated the process.
which the retailer purchased it, then the analytic insights from the transaction will be limited. Management must always think through in detail the types of data elements needed to address key decisions.
Complete data also means having adequate history to do analysis. Earthgrains needed a one-to-two year history of a retailer's inventory movement and stock outs before they could help the retailer make inventory management decisions. In many cases, just having transaction data isn't enough. It must exist for the right time period to be useful.
Timely Data Extracts. Transaction data must also be available in a timely fashion to support decision-making. At Earthgrains, sales data is pulled daily from SAP sales and distribution modules. This allows the vice president of sales to identify problems early and take action before the end of the sales period. To be useful, data extracts must be available for analysis on a frequency that matches a useful monitoring and decision-making cycle.
Transformation Process Analytic Processes
All of the contextual elements described above -strategy, organization, culture, skills, knowledge, technology, and datacombine to shape an organization's capabilities for data analysis. At Earthgrains, these combined inputs provided the motivation and ability to create five types of analytic outputs.
Standard Reports. The vice president of sales looked at a daily report that showed what products had been sold the previous day complete with their volumes and gross margin, as well as the total sales year-to-date.
Simple Analytic Outputs. Shortly after the sales and distribution module of SAP was installed, Earthgrains' management began doing basic customer and product profitability analysis. This analytic approach is simple, although it does require the organization to have previously adopted a disciplined approach to activity-based costing in order to be successful.
Complex Analytic Outputs. Over time, as management's understanding of the system developed, they began posing more complex queries to the analysts, e.g., How much do sales actually increase as a result of different types of promotions?
Data to Knowledge to Results · Page 30 ©2001 Accenture · Institute for Strategic Change · www.accenture.com/isc force in the Refrigerated Dough Division was told to stop servicing them. At the same time, another initiative resulted in the elimination of 20 percent of the division's product line which analysis had shown to be unprofitable. In the first year, the division's operating profit jumped over 50 percent.
New Processes. Earthgrains recognized that transaction data could create opportunities for redesigning fundamental business processes that create entirely new sets of decisions. For example, Earthgrains is using data from grocery retailers' inventory control systems, combined with historical data on stock outs, to set up a vendor-managed inventory process that significantly changes its relationships with retail grocers. Proactive use of transaction data may enable the redesign of core processes or it may simply improve decision-making within the existing process.
Finally, SAP data made it possible to redesign the accounts payable process in the Bakery Products Division. The decision to centralize and standardize this process increased the company's working capital by more than $40 million almost immediately, and provided resources that could be used to support the division's strategy to acquire additional bakeries.
Conclusion
Earthgrains' experience of turning transaction data into knowledge and results can provide other firms with valuable insights into how to develop such a capability themselves.
Here are some of the issues raised by Earthgrains that companies should consider: Management needs to assess the complexity and ambiguity of problems requiring analytic support in order to decide how to organizationally structure their analytic resources. More complex issues, requiring sophisticated modeling and data analysis, are better served when analysts and decision makers are closely linked organizationally, as they are in Earthgrains, because of the intense communication and collaboration required. Reward systems aligned with management's objectives for creating and acting on insights from the data are a critical factor for leveraging data-based decisions. Also critical is the development of technical capabilities for the inter-organizational transfer of transaction data. Managers looking to increase the confidence in a decision being made through the use of transaction data should ask: what decisions still involve a considerable amount of uncertainty, which if reduced would add significant value?
In the Refrigerated Dough Division, on the other hand, an attempt to implement a vendor-managed inventory process meant taking decisions about ordering away from buyers in the retail chains and embedding them in an inventory monitoring system managed by Earthgrains. In both cases, changing the location of decision-making was intended to improve the effectiveness of the overall business process.
Outcomes
Converting transaction data into knowledge is only effective if it produces business outcomes that improve financial performance. This usually happens as a result of new behaviors, new programs, or redesigned processes.
Changed Behaviors. Historically, disputed invoices have been a major problem for food manufacturers, since retailers often disagree with the prices they are charged on an invoice. Retailers always pay what they contend as being the price agreed upon, which is invariably lower than the price on the invoice. Because the cost of resolving disagreements is so high, manufacturers have traditionally lived with the deductions. This has resulted in losses of millions of dollars each year.
Having easy access to invoice data and a clear transaction history has enabled Earthgrains to improve processes supporting price synchronization before the invoice is printed. The ability to minimize disputed invoices has reduced invoice deductions by more than $4 million annually.
In order to encourage new behaviors, Earthgrains' managers aligned incentive and compensation structures with the proposed behaviors. Historically, the sales force in Earthgrains' Refrigerated Dough unit had been rewarded only for the quantity of products sold. But after SAP was implemented the compensation system was changed to reward sales people 50 percent on sales volume and 50 percent on gross profit. This significantly changed the behavior of the sales force, who became much more interested in understanding the current and potential profitability of their customers. Reward systems that aren't aligned with management's objectives for creating and acting on insights from the data are a serious impediment to leveraging this resource.
New Programs.
With the ability to analyze customer profitability came a new initiative to change the product mix purchased by those customers identified as being unprofitable. About 180 of these low margin retailers were unwilling to change their purchasing patterns. After 90 days, the sales just a few customer visits. Thus, Harrah's was able to pursue a micro-segmentation marketing strategy that dictated how much the company should spend for promotions on each customer to encourage either more frequent visits or longer stays at the company's properties.
Developing Analytic Resources. Under the sponsorship of Gary
Loveman, who had recently joined Harrah's as COO, the company also built up a core team of highly experienced database marketers and analysts at corporate headquarters. In the process, the COO replaced the entire corporate marketing team, which he deemed not sophisticated enough to implement the new relationship marketing strategy. Placing less value on casino industry experience and more on quantitative skills and broader business intelligence, Loveman sent a clear signal to the organization that Harrah's hiring criteria were changing. "Analytic groups need very smart people if they are to attract other smart people," he said.
Demonstrating Profitable Results. By mid-1999, the marketing team had run several successful pilots, including one using their new segmentation models to target customers of the company's Tunica, Mississippi casino. That direct mail campaign not only produced important new knowledge about Harrah's customers and their responses to specific promotional offers, but profits jumped from $29 per customer to $62 per customer for those who received the targeted promotions.
Barriers to Implementing Analytic Capabilities
Despite Harrah's early success in the process of building data-toknowledge capabilities, management still had to work through several critical issues that threatened the long term success of the initiative.
Redesigning Local Marketing Roles More sophisticated analytic capabilities being applied by the corporate marketing team meant the roles for local marketers had to change. Marketing managers at the firm's properties generally lacked an understanding of how to use the data to implement a new relationship marketing strategy. Transforming existing roles meant confronting considerable resistance among the local marketWhen the explosion of newly legalized gaming jurisdictions in the mid-1990s ground to a halt, Harrah's management realized that growth could no longer come from the construction of new casinos. Rather, growth would need to come from existing casinos and from an increase of cross-market visitations between the company's 18 properties. Harrah's new strategy was to drive growth through customer loyalty and data-driven marketing operations. The implementation of this strategy required the use of Harrah's extensive transaction data amassed on the gaming behaviors and resort preferences of existing customers. Harrah's experience provides important insights about the challenges faced by organizations seeking to enhance their competitive capabilities by using transaction data to support decision-making.
Building an Infrastructure
By mid-1999, Harrah's had made considerable progress in transforming its marketing function to take advantage of the extensive transaction data collected on its customers. In addition to a clear strategic purpose for using the data, the company had several other building blocks in place:
Transaction Data Infrastructure and Front End Analytic Tools. An Informix-based online database had been implemented in 1997 to capture daily transactions from the operational systems in all of Harrah's hotels and casinos. A year later, the information technology department completed a data mart, known as Marketing Work Bench, which gave analysts and managers querying and analytic capabilities, using software tools from Business Objects, Cognos, and SAS.
Generating Customer Data. The main source of customer data was Harrah's Total Gold program, a frequent flyer-like system that captured information on individual customer's playing behaviors, and rewarded repeat customers with complementary accommodations, meals, and show tickets. More than 60% of all slot play is captured on the Total Gold loyalty card, which tracks the type of game an individual customer plays, the amount of their wagers, and the length of time they play. Because the casino's take on each game is preset, Harrah's can predict the potential profitability of each customer for the company after tion, in large part because of their initiative's strong sponsorship. "Now we have the talent, the strategy is defined, and the capabilities are all in place," said one team member. "But you can have the best segmentation schemes and the brightest analysts in the world, and it won't get done or, more importantly, ingrained in the organization unless you have the support of senior management."
ing managers who felt left out of the newly centralized market segmentation process. It also required developing more sophisticated understanding throughout Harrah's of what it meant to be a data-driven, customer-focused organization. "A lot of people don't know how to tap the power of the data," said one manager. "We find people trying to recreate the same reports available from the old casino system, instead of figuring out new questions to ask about the business." Marketing managers thus were challenged to become more analytical and creative, yet less technical. Ultimately, Harrah's senior management had to decide who could be retrained and who should be replaced.
Creating New Knowledge Transfer Processes. Over time the corporate marketing team's analysis developed important new insights about customer behavior that could impact marketing decisions. But most of this new knowledge was only in the heads of the corporate analysts, and the COO knew the company had to create processes to transfer it to the operating units. Harrah's long term success would depend on creating an infrastructure to rapidly share new customer knowledge that could impact local marketing decisions. Harrah's has taken steps towards this goal by initiating a series of marketing workshops facilitated by the corporate marketing team, customizing analytic tools for each property, and encouraging constant communication between the corporate marketing team and the operating units.
Creating Standard Data Definitions. One of Harrah's primary strategic objectives was to increase revenues by increasing the number of cross-property visits. In order to measure the impact of marketing programs seeking to do this, the company needed standard data definitions across its operating units. But analysts found these standard definitions were missing. For example, the definition of when a customer's "trip" began and ended varied from casino to casino, making it difficult to compare the "average play per trip" across properties. In a decentralized operating environment like Harrah's, senior management still faced a special challenge in overcoming cultural barriers to standard data definitions. Without that standardization the long term payoff from the new strategy would be reduced.
Conclusion
Even though they faced significant challenges, the marketing team pushed forward, confident in their ability to shift the firm from a product-focused to a customer-focused organizaData to Knowledge to Results · Page 33 ©2001 Accenture · Institute for Strategic Change · www.accenture.com/isc processed orders became part of an order history database where address information was stored in a single field rather than in separate fields, and the individual customer's name was not retained. Moreover, once a product was shipped, the address in a particular record was never updated. Without updated individual customer names, EMD could not pursue a true one-to-one relationship marketing strategy.
EMD also lacked control over the marketing contact database, since it was owned by the sector's sales organization. According to Laura Hammond, manager of outbound marketing programs, "The field engineers [sales people] own the data, but they have never signed up for keeping it clean," she said. "As a result, they don't take time to implement data quality processes. There's no alignment between responsibility for the data and the need to use it, even though relationship marketing depends on how good your data is."
To identify their customers, EMD first extracted all customer sites from the order processing data base that showed a purchase of products from Test & Measurement divisions within the past five years. These name and address extracts were sent to an outside vendor, where they were cleaned and matched with records from the marketing contact database, which contained 700,000 names and records of 15 million interactions with potential customers (e.g. requests for a catalogue, response to a promotion, etc.). Customer sites found on both files were loaded into a cross reference table, which then gave marketing managers access to both site level order history and contact level demographic and response information.
Developing Effective Working Relationships
By late 1996, EMD marketing had begun working with Jeanne Munoz, an analyst from the California-based American Marketing Organization, to rank and score all the customers identified in the order history data. Since Munoz was based in New Mexico, while the EMD marketing team was based north of Denver, initial team meetings were frequently held at the Denver airport. There, they sought to learn each other's per-
The Electronic Measurements Division
In the mid-1990s, Hewlett Packard's Electronic Measurements Division (EMD), a producer of oscilloscopes, digital test equipment, and power supplies, was faced with increased competition from smaller companies and shrinking profit margins in a market that was no longer growing. Yet division management set a goal of increasing sales and boosting its market share dramatically by 2003. To pursue this strategy, EMD's marketing group had to find ways to increase revenues, while also reducing the division's marketing costs. EMD could not rely on the sales force for Hewlett-Packard's (HP's) Test & Measurement Organization (TMO)1, since they tended to favor selling the higher priced products from other divisions within the sector. EMD marketing had to find other channels such as advertising, catalogue sales, and direct mail to promote the division's 50-plus low priced products. This case is about how EMD effectively utilized these channels by developing the capabilities of using order history data to segment and target its potential customers in a global marketplace.
Building a Database for Marketing Analysis
In early 1996, EMD's sales efforts were hampered by not knowing where it could most effectively invest its marketing resources to boost sales for the division. The initial challenge faced by EMD's marketing team (based in the division's Loveland, Colorado, facility) was identifying specifically who its existing customers were. To do that, the marketers needed a customer file they could analyze. However, this was challenging because EMD lacked control over the order entry and the marketing contact databases.
HP's order processing database was being managed centrally by the TMO's Americas' Marketing Organization in Santa Clara, California. Moreover, the order processing system had not been designed with marketing in mind. Since there was no unique customer number attached to sales orders, it was all but impossible for HP to develop a unified view of how its customers were being served by the firm's many divisions. In addition, to 100,000 names. The names were determined by the most recent catalogue subscriptions and product inquiries.
In November 1996, EMD began using its three higher potential clusters of existing customers when developing its catalogue mailing list. Unfortunately, it was impossible to track the bottom line impact of specific catalogue mailings because no unique customer numbers were attached to the sales orders that catalogue customers placed through HP's Colorado-based call center. But senior management accepted other, more indirect evidence that using order history data to profile customers added value to the marketing efforts. For example, EMD's revenues always trended up during the three months after a catalogue was mailed. In one test, the division gained $1.5 million in revenues in the three months after mailing 150,000 catalogues outside of its normal marketing cycle. And, when a catalogue mailing in Europe was unexpectedly delayed three months, EMD's revenues there dropped significantly in those months as compared to the previous year. Although such evidence helped garner senior management support within the division, it was generally recognized that documenting bottom line business impacts of specific catalogue mailings would be necessary to gain broader political support for this type of data-to-knowledge initiative.
Once the customer profiles became the basis of EMD's outbound marketing strategy, Hammond's team could begin tracking the migration of specific customers through different clusters and evaluate the impact of various marketing initiatives. In addition, marketing programs were created to move customers into higher value clusters. A cross-sell mailing in late 1997, for example, targeted New Stars and Middle of the Road Folks with a special promotion on oscilloscopes in an attempt to move them to Cash Cow status. And a special reactivation mailing of the Basic Instruments catalogue sent to customers in defector clusters enabled Hammond's team both to cut 10,000 names from its overall mailing list and identify a small percentage of lapsed customers worth pursing more actively.
Learning Over Time
Analyzing responses to catalogue mailings and other promotions has helped develop EMD's understanding of which customers to invest in. "Our thinking about clusters has matured," said Hammond. "Looking for migration patterns between clusters has given us a much better understanding of customer acquisition and retention rates, and how the value of a customer almost doubles if we can get them to purchase in the spectives on the problems at hand. Munoz explains that in the beginning, she "didn't know their business, and wasn't sure what they wanted." John Shields, a program manager responsible for catalogue marketing noted "it could take an hour to get a simple question answered."
Shields notes, however, that "Over time, we developed a common language, and our knowledge evened out. It was very collaborative." The marketing team learned how to ask questions so that the analyst could interpret them in the context of the capabilities of the new data file. "To do that," said Hammond, "we had to understand the analyst's language, as well as her mental models of the different data files and how to manipulate them together."
Profiling Customers
Working with Munoz, the marketing team identified five market clusters, based on variables such as recency of purchases, number of products purchased, dollar volume, and date of first order. The higher potential clusters included: Cash Cows: customers with a long history of purchasing EMD products. They had purchased frequently over time, had made a purchase within the last 18 months, and were the biggest source of revenue. New Stars: new EMD customers whose dollar volumes ranked at the same level as Cash Cows. Middle of the Road Folks: customers whose volumes did not put them in the more profitable clusters, but whose activity was enough so they didn't fall into any of the "defector" clusters, that is, customers who had not purchased for a number of years.
This market segmentation immediately helped John Shields in making decisions about where to mail EMD's semi-annual Basic Instruments catalogue. Historically, the 170,000 names qualifying for the division's mailing list came from catalogue subscribers, recent customers, product inquiries, and people responding to promotions. But the marketing department had no idea which of these names were potentially the most profitable. The subscriber list was suspect, for example, because Shields felt the sales force tended to sign up their customers for all HP publications, like the catalogue, regardless of the customer's interest. The inability to differentiate between high and low potential customers created an unrealistically large pool for any marketing promotion. But because each catalogue costs $2.00 to mail, budget constraints always limited mailing volume
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Thus, in late 1998, a pilot program was launched that implemented a web-based analytic data mining tool from E.piphany for marketing managers.2 E.piphany's software tools allowed EMD's marketers to use order history data to make decisions in hours or days as compared to the weeks of interacting with Munoz that would have been required previously. E.piphany's software, for example, could support decisions such as: "Which products have complementary relationships, given an analysis of customer purchasing behaviors?" or "Which customers should be offered cross-sell products?" Providing EMD's marketers with direct access to customer data had several important impacts. First, it changed how managers work with the data. Providing direct access allows them to "rehearse" different questions, exploring the data before calling the analyst to discuss things. "Before we had E.piphany," said John Shields, "I would call Jeanne and say, 'The catalogue is on the press now. I need a mailing list.' But now, before the catalogue goes to press, I look at the trending data and see what's going on with the various clusters and market segments. I try to determine where the best marketing opportunities are."
Providing direct access through E.piphany's software has also changed the analyst's activities. "It takes me out of the straight forward questions that have simple answers, but that take time to do. That gives me more time to deal with real analysis, using statistical programs like SPSS."
Changing how decision-makers and analysts work with the data also inevitably changes how they interact. Munoz recalled a time recently when she arrived in Loveland for a meeting about a new customer profiling report. "I put the report out on the table," she said, "and told them 'I'm here to answer your questions.' I realized that was a big change because I no longer had to present the findings to the team, or teach them how to read the report. Instead, we immediately started having a discussion about what it meant for our business." second year." Hammond's team also came to believe that Middle of the Road Folks was the cluster that held the greatest potential for increased revenues, as opposed to the segments that they normally targeted. "That's a real culture shift for us," she said, "because traditional HP training says follow the money in your installed base and go after big accounts."
Because of changes in the customer base, and to ensure that customer profiles were up-to-date, the matching process linking order history and marketing contact data was rerun every six months. Customers were again rescored and assigned to clusters. One surprise was that many of the individual customer sites that represented a specific plant or office location were disappearing from EMD's data file over time. "Finally, we figured out that things were going on in the source [order processing] system that we didn't know about," explained the analyst. Munoz determined that the order history database had been programmed to find duplicate records for customer sites, and delete them, even though they contained data critical for EMD's evolving customer profiles. "We learned that it is critical to know the details of all the systems upstream from you," said Hammond, reflecting on the costly surprise of assuming that their core transaction systems were static.
Data Quality Project
As EMD came to rely on order processing and marketing contact data to implement its relationship marketing programs, new questions arose about the quality and accuracy of the data being used. For example, the order processing system had not been designed to produce data that would serve as a source for direct mail lists. Thus, a data quality project was undertaken to evaluate the data being used and to identify any processes related to data quality that EMD could impact.
The three-month study showed that data in the marketing contact database was about 90% accurate, which was higher than expected. But it also revealed that about 20 percent of the database changed each year when people changed positions or left their company. As a result, Hammond's team realized they had to give greater weight to the "recency of purchase" criteria when selecting the best, most reachable names.
Broadening Access to the Data
By early 1998, two years after EMD had begun using cluster analysis to invest its marketing budget more effectively, Ham- Finally, the evolving relationship between EMD's marketing team and its database analyst has produced more effective decision-makers got direct access to the data, Munoz was so busy handling routine queries that she didn't have time for repeated discussions about a particular mailing list she was supposed to pull. But more frequent interactions now enable marketers to continually refine the criteria used to develop mailing lists, which result in more productive lists. And Shields says he is able to make better decisions when deciding where to mail the Basic Instruments catalogue because Munoz can provide him with richer insights about customers in different clusters. "This is where it all pays off," said Hammond. "We've gotten beyond just understanding each other's language and the context of the problem to a true partnership where the analyst is actually engaged in the business conversation."
Evolving Data-to-Results Capabilities
Reflecting back on her experiences in using transaction data to pursue a relationship marketing strategy, Laura Hammond said: "It's not a linear process going from data to analysis to decision-making. It evolves very organically. We have great data now, but it has taken us a long time to get there. And we need to assume we're always going to have to work on the database. Over time, you think you know more about your customers and the market, but there's also a lot more ambiguity created by the insights you get. The company's culture has made a big difference in this because we're basically a really curious organization. They created a risk-free environment for us where it was okay to learn and fail, as long as we applied the learning."
One of Hammond's colleagues added a final point in explaining the success of EMD's relationship marketing initiative when she said, "It really helps to have someone who is a data 
Conclusion
EMD's use of data is seen as a model for other HewlettPackard businesses to follow. Six programs are currently using the E.piphany tool set, and initiatives are underway to teach users of the tool set about the data. EMD's experience in using transaction data to generate business value may be limited in scope, but valuable in its implications for other companies seeking to transform data into knowledge and results. The following are some of the key insights extracted from our observations at EMD that may be leveraged by any company seeking to transform data into knowledge and results: There is a strong need for coordination and alignment between those who feed and maintain the database and those who use it. Expect changes in the core transaction systems and anticipate their impacts on data quality. Analysts and decision-makers will work together more effectively if they have time to get to know each other. Data-to-knowledge capabilities will have much more credibility if their benefits can be measured. Effectively using data for decision-making will help solve problems, but it will also create many new questions and opportunities.
Data-to-knowledge capabilities must be developed within the existing cultural and structural context, unless top management is willing to drive the transformational change to create new patterns of coordination and communication. 2 See www.epiphany.com for more information.business outcomes. For example, before he believed that Kraft could achieve a competitive advantage through fact-based marketing innovation. Finally, he sought to remake Kraft's trade marketing execution capabilities by empowering the sales force with superior information, analytic capabilities, and results-oriented recommendations.
At the end of a lengthy evaluation process, a particular information supplier was chosen. The supplier's top management has enthusiastically embraced Kraft's vision, describing it as a model for teaming with their customers. But getting to this point took a great deal of work on the part of both organizations. Ten senior Kraft people spent six months hammering out the first deal. It took a long time for the two organizations to develop a shared understanding and vision for working together. One key step to achieving the seamless integration of the companies was the creation of an onsite "mirror" of the information supplier dedicated to servicing Kraft.
Kraft is now the supplier's biggest "ship to" customer in the US. The relationship between the companies appears to be quite strong and focused on results. Both companies mutually developed and live by an annual and five year plan. There is also a clear process for communications, review, and a mutually agreed upon reward structure. The plan has interim milestones, metrics, and objectives for the alliance and for each company. The alliance has the attention of the CEO's of both companies, who regularly monitor progress against agreed upon metrics.
Key Applications of Data
Brand management is a major source of competitive advantage for Kraft. Kraft believes that its ability to analyze and exploit category data is central to marketplace success. Kraft uses data in several different applications.
Production planning is a continuing challenge for Kraft, since their products are sent to warehouses and typically have a long shelf life. QUEST is a goal setting application that inteData is like oxygen at Kraft. Our executives don't question the need for it, because we use it daily.
-Eric W. Leininger, Kraft Foods Vice President, Marketing Information Services
Kraft measures its success by its progress towards its goal of "undisputed industry leadership." Bob Eckert, Kraft's CEO, has asked his senior management team to "work with employees to deliver the numbers; live the values of focus, innovation and passion; and lead through teamwork." To achieve this goal, Kraft is pursuing several innovative strategies. One of these strategies is the transformation of its vast stores of scan and other transaction data into actionable business knowledge.
Kraft has several initiatives aimed at this transformation. These initiatives are aimed at better service and better profitability for Kraft as well as for key information providers and customers. The win-win value proposition is at the heart of Kraft's success with these tools and the analytical and decision-making processes which enable them. Our interviews focused upon a few examples of partnering to use transaction data: Marketing Effectiveness (partnering with a key information supplier) Category Captaincy and the 3 step Category Builder (partnering with customers)
Marketing Effectiveness
A key initiative in Kraft's data-to-knowledge process is its partnership with a leading market information supplier. After years of frustration with various information vendors, Kraft decided to take a different approach -to partner with one vendor and commit to making it a win-win relationship. Kraft asked its vendors to propose to provide "everything for everyone and make it available right away…" CEO Bob Eckert had several objectives for this partnership. First, he envisioned an "information utility" where everyone in Kraft had access to current, decision-oriented information. Secondly, As a result of the growing trend to name a category captain, the role of the sales force has changed dramatically. The sales force, already subject to long hours and high turnover, understood the importance of becoming category captains. Yet they were concerned about the additional work it would entail. Management recognized the need to build the analytic capabilities of the sales team. The sales force required a greater understanding of issues such as assortment, space planning, and promotion strategies. Training the sales force to shift to a more consultative sales role was also vitally important to success.
3-Step Category Builder
The 3-Step category builder is a critical component of Kraft's category management strategy. It enables Kraft sales representatives to effectively partner with customers (e.g.: an individual grocery location, such as Kroger or Safeway). The category management process enables the sales representative to quickly collect the necessary data and present sound recommendations to the store manager.
Nick Feimer, a Kraft executive responsible for deploying this program to the sales force, states "the reason why we have done so well is that we focus on what is truly critical." Kraft believes that they have identified the most important data elements which drive sales. The 80-20 rule is a crucial guiding principle for this process, since Kraft and its customers are swimming in data and struggling with the question of "how do I unleash the power of information?" Mark Froseth, a Kraft Vice President in Sales and Customer Service, perhaps said it best, "the amount of information continues to multiply so the challenge is to choose the right tools to turn the data into useable knowledge." Kraft sales representatives collect less than 20% of the data used by others for performing similar analyses, with superior results. Stores generally realize a marginal sales growth of 3-4% vs. a control group.
Kraft sales representatives are assisted in their work by an analytic group deployed out into regional sales offices. Analysts are able to perform the sophisticated analyses quickly and efficiently, in a fraction of the time required by competitors (25 hours vs. 500 hours). The conclusions are delivered to the sales representative in a "standardized business case template." While the analysis itself is quite complicated, the results are put into a Powerpoint presentation. This presentation provides a clear analysis and a set of compelling business recommendations. Supported facts are easily accessible as well. As new insights into category management are develgrates internal inventory and forecasts together with data to create a production planning forecast. This system creates a "true shipments" forecast, which is more reliable than invoicing systems or shipment data alone.
Promotion/pricing effectiveness models link "causal" data to internal transaction data, such as divisional P&L, inventory forecasting, and weather data. The objective is to mine new insights which can influence buyer behavior. For example, through this system they learned that Mayonnaise sales are affected by the weather, but BBQ sales are more affected by seasonality and promotions. The pricing models also are extensively used by brand managers to make tactical promotion decisions. Kraft is seeking to standardize their diverse product managers around similar tools and applications. The planner workbench is designed to reduce the 40-60% of time spent by planners on data extraction and manipulation. It is also intended to provide a consistent and robust analytic capability (based upon SQL Server, Visual Basic and SAS) which can replace a variety of "homegrown" applications ranging from Fortran code to 123 macros which perform regression.
Category management is viewed by both organizations as a major achievement. Through an in depth analysis of category information, Kraft sales representatives can work effectively with individual grocers to identify problems and opportunities, and to make sound recommendations supported by information.
Category Captaincy
Jim Kinney, CIO of Kraft, has experienced a "revolution in Consumer Packaged Goods over the last 4-5 years." Grocery stores are frequently "outsourcing" each product category to a category captain. Store managers choose each category captain among the major CPG companies supplying the category. Category captains perform category analysis and advise store managers regarding product placement, inventory, and vendor mix for the entire category, not just their own products. While category captains are generally large companies with a Top 3 market share, they may not be the market leader. Rather, grocers choose the vendor who demonstrates the best capability to optimize the bottom line value of the category. Kraft and its competitors place a very high value on earning category captaincies. Establishing a productive partnering relationship, together with the ability to demonstrate superior analytic capabilities, is the key to achieving category captaincy.
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Until about 4 years ago, Kraft was a highly decentralized organization. As a result, data and organizations are often quite dissimilar, making comparisons difficult. It is often necessary to work through several individuals in each product line, persuading them to share their information with others. For example, Finance has been unwilling to share some data with the business units "because they won't understand it."
Skills and Knowledge Context
Many Kraft executives viewed business capabilities as something which must evolve over time. People are able to truly understand things only after going through a process. They must have time to grasp the fundamentals before they can progress to the next level. Kraft has managed this by rolling out new reports and processes in a staged manner. They believe it is better to start with only the most essential, basic information and add complexity over time. This staged roll-out also facilitates a fire-aim-fire methodology, a process allowing quick deployment with refinement of tools and methodologies over time.
Often, initiatives will first provide data access to a group of users. Sometimes, these interim solutions are "throw aways" which are replaced as users become familiar with the data. As they gain insight into the data and how it can be applied, there is generally an effort to cleanse data and make it more useful. This next stage yields additional insights, and begins to allow users to more clearly understand the strategic levers for their business. These efforts lead to the development of a common understanding of how Kraft creates results and adds value to the business. In turn, more variables are identified (often external to Kraft), which need to be incorporated. This "external data," once integrated into the business model, provides additional insights and leads to the evolution of the organization's "mental model" of the business. As the business drivers become broadly understood, it is possible to encapsulate that knowledge into broader business processes and applications. Often this will involve teaming with an external vendor, such as a consultant or information provider, to create new applications.
There are some distinct organizational roles at Kraft that help the data-to-knowledge process. The program manager is responsible for deploying the new business capability. For example, in the category management process, program managers oped, the business case template is revised so that it only focuses on the information that Kraft's customers need to better manage their categories and business.
To Kraft, the effort to partner more effectively with their customers is clearly worth it. In a recent Canonndale Associates study of retailers, Kraft rose from 14th to the top 2 in having the best customer insight and the highest ability to exploit category information.1 They monitor and have achieved significant improvements in: I) volume by chain, II) new product sales, and III) new category captain wins.
Additional Points Using the Data-to-Knowledge Framework 2 Strategic Context
Kraft executives pride themselves on superior execution of their marketing strategy. Initiatives to transform transaction data into actionable knowledge and results are central to Kraft's competitiveness. These efforts are based upon management's belief that win-win relationships with its customers will be by increasing data-based decision-making.
Kraft's sales force is moving away from a relationship-based sales model. Retailers' razor thin profits and the vast array of product choices require a more analytic approach to bottomline oriented decisions.
Culture / Organizational Context
From the top down, Kraft's key metrics are product sales and year-over-year volume growth. Almost everyone's bonuses are tied more or less directly to sales. The company lives and dies by its market share and unit-volume growth.
Kraft has a strong analytic culture. CEO Bob Eckert and the leadership team are firm believers in data-based decisionmaking. Senior management takes a metric driven approach to gauging the success of key initiatives such as the information provider alliance. CEOs of both companies personally approved the interim and long term metrics for the alliance team.
Similarly, there is a long history of using marketing data to make decisions about advertising and promotion. The use of information provider, scan-based, and other transaction data has gained greater acceptance over the last four years. It appears that some of the comfort that the top of the organi- While Kraft has a relatively sophisticated technical environment, they still deal with issues of technological complexity. They are in the process of moving to more of an Intranet environment and are seeking to replace "homegrown" analytic applications (such as the regression analysis model based upon 123) with a more consistent analytic tool set.
Analytic and Decision-Making Processes
The category management process is very well defined and broadly understood. A Kraft sales representative partners with a buyer at a particular retail outlet to gather basic information through a structured interview tool (an Excel template). The Kraft sales representative then takes this information back to his regional analyst. The analyst and the sales representative couple this information with relevant panel, census, or other third party data. The analyst then performs a structured series of analyses using this data and store level transaction data. The results of these analyses are put into a standard business case template (a Powerpoint presentation) which contains a situation analysis, recommendations, and supporting information. Using this information, the representative uses the data to help customers sell to the end-consumer. A clear understanding of what drives sales and profitability are an essential component of this process. This understanding allows Kraft to reduce analytic time (and therefore costs) as well as produce a superior outcome.
Outcomes
The 3-Step Category Builder is a great example of the transformation of data into knowledge and results. According to Kraft, it has helped customers achieve 2 to 5 percentage point higher growth in managed categories as compared to control groups. Although this growth rate may seem low when compared to other industries, in the flat growth retail grocery worked with the sales force to ensure that the standard reports and processes were useful and being adopted correctly.
A data analyst role exists in many different parts of the organization. In category management, for example, it was decided that the role of the analyst was to leverage the sales staff and to utilize specialized skills effectively. There are two groups of these analysts, one at headquarters and the other deployed into regional sales offices. The headquarters group (~35) did more of the ad-hoc analysis and the development of the templates used for standard reporting while the regional analysts (~180) partnered with individual sales representatives to perform various analyses including the category management analysis. Kraft is challenged to find and retain analysts which have the requisite technical skills and understand the business. Competitors have begun to target Kraft analysts for recruitment. Kraft has had to look to non-traditional sources to locate the necessary skills.
Data Context
Kraft has long used data for marketing purposes but over the last four years has integrated the use of data into the sales function as well. Marketing historically relied on panel, demographic, and transaction data to better understand end-consumers. With the advent of category management, transaction data is increasingly being used in partnership with retailers to optimize the retailers' shelf space. The retailers' scan data is paired with panel, demographic, and other transaction data to determine opportunities and to improve retailer financial returns.
Since most Kraft products are distributed to retail grocery chains' warehouses, Kraft does not have data on where its products are in the pipeline until they are sold. This is considered an issue for Kraft since visibility essentially disappears after the product has been shipped to the customer. Visibility does not return until the product is scanned at the check-out line. Kraft must perform back-end analysis to ensure that product sold to a customer on discount for a promotion in Des Moines doesn't end up being sold for a substantial mark-up in New York.
Technology Context
Like many diversified organizations, Kraft employs a broad range of analytic technologies to manage its business. Technologies include: Data warehouse: The most significant transaction systems for the marketing organization are fed into a Redbrickbased data warehouse that is populated with three years
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Market Network:
This initiative is aimed at taking the guess work and personal biases out of branch closing decisions by using a modeling process that evaluates each branch's current and long-term profitability. The modeling process uses a variety of data, including transaction data from the branch, business commerce trends in the area, department of transportation usage data, drive-around information, geo-mapping, and staffing configurations. Transaction data is aggregated at the branch level.
URL (Unprofitable Customer Segments):
The mirror opposite of PRO, URL focuses on the bottom three customer deciles (in terms of non-profitability). The modeling and decision-support system seeks to identify sales strategies for converting more of these households into long-term profitable customers. URL is the most recent of the three initiatives launched by Wachovia.
Wachovia's Supportive Culture and Direction
The ease with which Wachovia turned to data modeling to advance the strategic direction on profitability was grounded in a highly supportive culture and prior experience with these kinds of techniques. During the 1980s for example, while many peer banks' credit ratings were going south and large portions of competitors' loan portfolios were being written off, Wachovia was envied for the quality of it holdings, strict lending practices, and loan review policies. Part of this was the result of good, solid policies and practices. But these policies and practices were strongly supported, indeed in some instances driven by, long established database management information systems. Further, there was active encouragement from managers to use data in the initial and ongoing monitoring of risk management.
This and other early-on successes and experiences served Wachovia well when they decided to build a stronger customer-centric process utilizing data. The original focus was on
Strategic Setting
Throughout the 90's, Wachovia generally played the "bigger is better" scale game, as did most banks at the time. The rules were pretty simple: profitability was assumed to be tantamount to acquiring more customers, more branches, more lines of business, more credit cards, etc. However, as industry consolidation occurred at an increasingly rapid rate, the stakes in the game got higher and higher. Wachovia's two nearest neighbors [First Union and NationsBank (later BankAmerica)] were particularly aggressive. Wachovia instead adopted a more quality niche role, although it still had a very large presence in the southeast. The code word at Wachovia became profitability. This meant quality customers, quality products and services, and quality growth potential. Businesses that did not fit this model (e.g., student loans) were either spun-off or sold.
Data-to-Knowledge to Results Initiatives
For Wachovia, this refocus on profitability naturally extended to using data-driven models to enhance the strategic initiative. The first applications were on the retail side of the business. Three somewhat independent but related projects were launched:
1. PRO-Strategy: PRO is aimed at the bank's top 25% most profitable consumer households who are current customers of Wachovia. PRO uses customer level transaction data (exclusive of consumer credit products such as credit cards and mortgages) extracted from the bank's mainframe applications to generate new product leads. These leads are electronically linked to personal financial advisors (assigned to the top tier accounts), bankers (regional and branch level) and call service representatives. The essence of the analytic process is a consumer scoring technique that calculates and then rank orders the probability of customer purchase for each of ten major product groupings. 
Wachovia Bank
Wachovia Corporation is a leading interstate bank holding company with dual headquarters in Atlanta and Winston-Salem, North Carolina. In terms of the standard bank measuring rod, Wachovia ranked 16th overall in asset holdings ($64.1 billion as of the beginning of 1999). Total market capitalization is $17.8 billion. Wachovia has more than 20,900 employees servicing over 750 offices, principally located in the southeastern US. Wachovia offers a comprehensive set of products and services serving the retail, corporate and institutional marketplaces.
inside field sales force. Some of the southern employees referred to this as "getting the dog to hunt."
Cooperatives largely achieved by the development of a comprehensive sales communication process that was managed by a senior vice president reporting directly to both the president of the retail banks (organized by state) and the executive vice president in charge of retail banking (i.e., the lines of business). The specific techniques used to enlist this support tended to vary from case to case, but the principal types were as follows:
Implementation plan and roll-out: "We had a very detailed implementation program. Very specific things were noted for each day. The market representative was responsible for the overall implementation. It was important that the implementation program convey the message that it was the market or field staff that had really generated the ideas underlying the analytics. We (analytic, head office types) tried to stay in the background. We built a very strong communication program that really defined the entire sales approach."
Presentations / Education: "We worked very hard to make the case a compelling one. We had a presentation that went out into the field and said: 'Here's the problem, here's the analysis, here's the findings, here are the options, and here is what we are going to do'."
Training: "Everyone had to go through the same training (for PRO). It was this idea of 'sweat equity' that really created ownership. This was the idea of using PRO -to go through the training to gain ownership. This implementation period took about 120 days."
Performance measurement: "We collect and maintain monthly performance outcome numbers on our models and review how we are doing in terms of profit behavior. The results are used for senior and product management reporting but for improving the model itself."
Weekly Conference calls: "We scheduled weekly conference calls with the field sales staff to hear from them directly what was working and not working. These conferences were extremely valuable and in a couple of instances led to changes the field staff wanted to incorporate in the delivery system." Joint Data Gathering and Model-building: "We spent two days in a van going around gathering this data. They couldn't argue that we did not understand their markets. A process of bonding occurred precisely as a result of this mapping process. So they got to know us personally and For Wachovia, using data and analytic models for decisionmaking was not a passing fad to be embraced and later discarded; rather, it was a way of doing business. In effect it was part of their culture. Like other companies in our study, Wachovia experienced their share of data quality issues: However, one of the differences with Wachovia was that no one questioned the importance of having quality data. Perhaps more importantly, no one questioned their own individual responsibility in creating and maintaining quality data. Additionally, because transforming data into knowledge and then results was viewed as part of Wachovia's core strategic position, there was virtual unanimity in support of the entire effort. Fred Koehl, head of the analytic group, noted this corporate imperative when he commented as follows:
"It was a blessed project from the outset. Management supported it.. Everyone was on the same playing field. The general attitude was 'guys we have to get this done'."
This kind of senior management support often spells the difference between success and failure in data-to-knowledge initiatives. The road from pure data to useful outcomes is far from an easy or straight-forward process. Besides the obvious and considerable issues involved in translating business objectives and understanding into analytical models, there are a variety of data quality, technical, and human resource issues to contend with. Wachovia was indeed "blessed" to have this kind of support, and it made all the difference in the world in terms of the successes they achieved.
Sales Management Process
Wachovia was "blessed" in another very important way. In addition to support from senior management, there was a clear recognition at the outset of the PRO and Marketing Networks that management's ability to realize outcomes depended in large part on the acceptability and cooperation from the Let's explore each of these in more detail:
Develop Sponsorship. The vice president believed that if he was going to get executive support for an enterprise-wide CRM initiative he had to link it directly to financial impacts, and even earnings per share. As a result, his change management approach included a major program of educating senior management about the importance of CRM to the firm's overall business strategy. The vice president identified 16 key decision-makers and delivered a targeted message to each one, showing how CRM could help them with their issues.
"Once we had senior management's attention and linked CRM's benefits to the company's long range plans, the dollars just opened up," said the Vice President. "We aligned our vision of CRM into what other top managers were doing and it became a critical project." One measure of the Vice President's success was that U S West executives began touting the emerging CRM strategy to Wall Street analysts as a source of competitive advantage for the firm. Demonstrating business impact is usually a key step in gaining long term executive support for data-to-knowledge initiatives.
Change Beliefs and Behaviors. One of the biggest challenges facing the vice president and his team was changing the culture at U S West. The Small Business and Consumer marketing units had to be changed from a monopoly-oriented environment that was distinctly product-focused to a more customeroriented attitude. This meant overcoming cultural resistance that the vice president estimated was 9.5+ on a 10 scale.
Creating new beliefs around the use of data for decision-making was partly a matter of showing how this new approach was linked directly to business results. It also meant educating the organization about the value of using analytic outputs.
When U S West lost its monopoly position in the regional telecommunications industry, senior management expected the firm would lose 35% of its customer base. Thus a major challenge facing the company was how to grow revenues in an increasingly competitive market. In late 1997, U S West's vice president of relationship and database marketing launched a major initiative to increase sales with existing customers, retaining the most profitable and potentially profitable ones. His goal was to transform the former monopoly business into a truly customer-centric entity by leveraging the firm's transaction and marketing data.
This case illustrates some critical tasks for data-to-knowledge implementation teams that must be addressed if a company is to maximize the value of its data infrastructure.
Company Context
As head of database marketing for U S West's retail business, the vice president and his team focused mostly on the firm's Consumer and Small Business segments. From the outset, their goal was to create a "closed loop marketing system" which meant linking inbound and outbound channels so that no data about customers would fall through the cracks. For example, when a customer who had recently been sent a mailing about U S West's Internet services called in with an unrelated billing question, the customer service representative would know about the Internet mailing and could try to close the sale. This approach would enable U S West to capture, analyze, and apply customer data to target its most potentially profitable customers more effectively with the right products in the right channel.
But to create this closed loop marketing capability, commonly referred to as customer relationship management (CRM), the database marketing vice president had to pursue a complex organizational and cultural change initiative. Five activities stand out in the U S West experience as critical to developing broad organizational capabilities to better use transaction data for decision-making. They are as follows:
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makers' levels of trust in the evolving data infrastructure. Developing this infrastructure is an ongoing process that continues to evolve as an increasingly sophisticated group of end users demand broader access to high quality data.
Manage the Implementation of Multiple Projects. Building broad data-to-knowledge capabilities at U S West has meant managing multiple interdependent projects needed to create the necessary organizational changes. "But it's not a linear, staged process," said the database marketing vice president. "It's more like managing a 15-level chess game because there are 15 CRM-related projects happening concurrently, and their interdependencies must be managed."
To add to this complexity, most projects required cross-functional integration of multiple types of expertise. One U S West project, for example, has focused on implementing "intelligent scripting" capabilities in the company's call centers. This would enable customer service representatives to use the latest information on a specific customer to determine the best product to try to sell them. The intelligent scripting project required expertise in call center management, leading edge scripting software, model building, training and change management processes, as well as knowledge of the retail market.
Managing these cross-functional projects was tricky and time consuming, not only because of the different experts involved, but because sponsors had to take into account the company's ability to absorb the new capabilities being provided. The database marketing vice president worked hard to see that decision-makers would view the new data-to-knowledge capabilities as an enablement, rather than as a threat.
At U S West this meant that after piloting each project, the team went through a significant period of educating the organization about the benefits of the new capabilities to get the necessary buy-in. And, where necessary, developers would adjust the system's capabilities to provide something the organization would accept. Sometimes, while creating a pilot for a project, the CRM team would simultaneously begin building the infrastructure required for full implementation, even though the program had not been approved for a full roll out. This was done in recognition of the lead time necessary to create the larger infrastructure. And the CRM team wanted to minimize decision-makers' frustration with being denied access to the new capabilities once their enthusiasm was pumped up by seeing the results of a pilot.
"We're trying to move business units from a monopoly, costplus paradigm to where they value targeting people based on model outputs," said the database marketing vice president. "But that requires a new recognition that analytic modeling is now central to our core competencies."
Getting this message across was not easy, however. Often the data-to-knowledge sponsor thought he was succeeding only to find out that the old behaviors still prevailed. "At times the culture can seduce you into thinking you're making progress selling CRM," said one team member, "only to find out later that nothing has changed. Trying to change this culture is like hitting up against a Jell-O wall."
One critical action taken by the vice president was to use his influence to replace three IT directors and one marketing director, all of whom had refused to change in support of the new strategic vision. These moves sent an important signal to the rest of the company that new behaviors around data use were now expected. Culture change is one of the stickiest issues in changing a firm's orientation to data use. It takes time, and invariably involves a combination of carrot and stick initiatives to encourage the new behaviors needed.
Create Technical and Data Infrastructure. Throughout the different phases of implementing new data-to-knowledge capabilities, the vice president's team continued their efforts to improve the technology and data infrastructure needed to support new ways of working. As a corporate group they tried to enforce the sharing of common technology platforms as much as possible to reduce costs, enhance organizational knowledge around particular technologies, and increase opportunities for cross-unit interaction.
At a tactical level, the database marketing group also worked to implement integrated software tools that would provide faster and more sophisticated analytic and data production capabilities. For example, U S West has linked daily updates from the firm's service order system to analytic models and more automated Valex Campaign Management software to support event-triggered marketing campaigns.
At the same time, programs to enhance data quality demanded ongoing resources and attention. Data infrastructure problems sometimes created unexpected set backs at the tactical level as product managers tried to change their approach to marketing only to find the data they were using did not meet expected quality standards. This not only placed new resource demands on the technical staff, but it also reduced decision-Finally, as new data-to-knowledge capabilities took hold, sponsors found their resources stretched increasingly thin, as end users began demanding more and more changes and improvements in the systems involved. The database marketing team at U S West found this conflict an ever-present challenge. "There is constant tension between managers with more tactical requests who want us to help them stop the bleeding," said one team member, "and our goal of providing the organization with world class CRM capabilities." Balancing priorities and managing conflicting demands with limited resources is an inherent part of evolving data-to-knowledge capabilities.
Change Roles and Responsibilities. Using multiple projects to create the technology and data infrastructure needed to support new analytic capabilities is only part of the story.
Redefining the roles and responsibilities necessary to make use of the data in analysis and decision-making was also important at U S West. For example, implementing the intelligent scripting capabilities in the company's call centers would change the responsibilities of customer service representatives, turning them into more proactive salespeople. This required new skills and training.
In another part of the company, one director changed the entire structure of her marketing team. Instead of asking individuals to perform a broad range of database marketing tasks, team members became more specialized into roles such as campaign manager, list manager, data analyst, modeler, and product manager. Using transaction data effectively to enhance or transform key business processes will almost always require significant changes in key roles. Data-toknowledge sponsors must anticipate this and plan to implement these changes.
